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## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT—UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 1947

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Chan Gurney (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Gurney (chairman), Robertson of Wyoming, Saltonstall, Tydings, and Byrd.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Prior to this meeting this morning, we heard representatives of the Army and the Navy.

This morning, the committee is very happy to have the top ranking man in the fine United States Marines, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

General, the committee is very anxious to have in the record your statement on this very important piece of postwar legislation. You may proceed in any way you wish. I am sure before many minutes of the hearing go by, we will have some more committee members present.

If you proceed with your formal statement, they can catch up with you when they arrive.

### STATEMENT OF GEN. A. A. VANDEGRIFT, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

General VANDEGRIFT. Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief formal statement that I would like to read to the committee, if I may.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as Commandant of Marines and spokesman for our corps, I desire to discuss certain features of the pending measure.

I have never opposed the principle of unification, although I have expressed strong disapproval of the objectives underlying the original Collins plan for outright merger of the armed forces. I am in accord with the over-all objectives which the bill now under consideration seeks to attain.

In order to make clear what I consider the over-all objectives of this bill, I would like to interpolate the following paragraph:

The over-all objectives of S. 758, as I see them, are those of establishing a more economically integrated means of providing for national security and at the same time formalizing the proven machinery that was developed to such good purpose during the war, and included in this bill, such as:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the National Security Resources Board.

In order to tie together these agencies, and for better coordination of the several services, there should be an executive appointed from civil life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, whose duty, under the direction of the President, shall be to recommend to him policies and programs for the National Defense Establishment. He should be empowered to exercise supervision and coordination of the departments and agencies.

Since reading some of the testimony which has been given before this committee, particularly that of General Eisenhower and the Under Secretary of War, Mr. Royall, I have become increasingly concerned about the danger of lessening the degree of civilian, including congressional, control over our Military Establishment by concentrating great powers in a single individual. As a result of this testimony I have become apprehensive of the results that may ensue unless those powers are more sharply defined and there is a clearer meeting of minds as to just what authority is vested in the Secretary of National Defense.

I think it is apparent to everyone that this is a bill of the broadest national character, with a heavy impact upon the civilian as well as the military structure. I am sure that any imperfections will be adequately dealt with by other witnesses called before this committee, witnesses who are leaders in the fields of government, education, science, industry, and labor, and who are competent to speak in the broad terms necessary. My own comments will be confined to the military aspects of the bill, and within that field I shall limit myself still further to those defects of immediate concern to the Marines.

Stated concisely and with respect to the Marine Corps, the defects of the bill are twofold:

First: It affirms the existence of the Marine Corps without expressly stating the roles and missions which the corps is expected to perform.

Second: It completely excludes the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish.

In the balance of my statement, I shall elaborate upon these defects and attempt to convey to you their full import.

The failure of the bill to assign specific functions to the Marine Corps is a source of grave concern to me, for it allows the corps to be stripped of everything but name—to reduce it to a role of military impotence. I wish to dwell upon the position of extreme vulnerability in which the corps will be placed by enactment of the bill in its present form.

Unless a statutory statement of the missions of the Marine Corps is included, its functions become dependent solely upon the arbitrary judgment of the Secretary of National Defense. The size, the character, and the organization of the corps will lie in his hands. There is not a single specialty which the Marine Corps has brought to a state of perfection which cannot be summarily transferred to some other service.

Section 106 of the bill excludes the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish. I believe that the exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish is a serious defect.

I believe that the exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish is a serious defect. The Marine Corps has a long and distinguished history of service to the Nation, and it is essential that it be able to participate in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish.

There is only one way to ensure that the Marine Corps is able to participate in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish. That way is to include the Marine Corps in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish.

I regard it as the duty of Congress to specify the reasons for the exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish. The exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish is a serious defect.

Specifically, I wish to point out that the exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish is a serious defect. The Marine Corps has a long and distinguished history of service to the Nation, and it is essential that it be able to participate in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish.

The other defect of the bill is the exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish. The exclusion of the Marine Corps from participation in the joint bodies and agencies which the bill would establish is a serious defect.

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Section 106 of the bill, which contains the sole mention of the Marines and which goes no further than to affirm the presence of a Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, contains no guaranty that the corps will retain a single one of the characteristics it has today, with the one exception of its name. As a guaranty of vigorous Marine Corps existence, section 106 is completely without meaning unless it is accompanied by a statement of what the roles and missions of the Marine Corps shall be.

I believe that Congress and the people have a clear-cut idea as to the sort of Marine Corps they wish to maintain. I believe that they wish to maintain in the future the same kind of a Marine Corps they have known in the past—one which serves aboard our ships of war and guards our naval stations—one which protects our national interests on foreign shores when danger threatens—above all, one which has developed amphibious warfare and which stands ready in substantial force to sail with the fleet to wage such warfare whenever and wherever the occasion arises.

There is only one way to insure that the Nation shall have this kind of Marine Corps. That insurance—that guaranty—is a plain and unmistakable legislative statement of exactly what Congress expects the Marines to do.

I regard it as highly appropriate, as well as urgently necessary, that Congress specify the functions of the corps. To do so is no more than to state the reasons for its existence. When Congress calls the several armed services into being, it recognizes a specific need for each of the several components of national security. The very existence of each component is predicated upon a conclusion by Congress that a mission actually exists—that a role must be filled.

As specifically relates to the Marine Corps, Congress should ask itself whether the traditional need for an amphibious fighting force—in being still exists—whether the need for a Marine Corps is in fact justified by the events of the past and forecasts of the future. If it determines the Marine Corps' function is still to exist, then it should be set forth in law—otherwise the implicit will of Congress can be utterly, and legally, ignored.

The other defect of the bill, as it affects the Marine Corps, is the exclusion of marine representatives from the joint bodies and agencies to be established or given statutory recognition by the bill. From the Joint Staff down to the Central Intelligence Agency, the participation of marine officers is not mentioned. As the bill now stands, it denies to these joint bodies the wealth of experience and unique knowledge of a corps which literally epitomizes joint operations.

The Marine Corps has participated in joint operations throughout its entire existence. The joint doctrines of both the Army and the Navy today are in large part the results of the research, study, and thinking of marine officers who, for 20 years prior to Pearl Harbor, devoted their conscientious and unceasing efforts to the formulation and perfection of the methods and techniques of amphibious warfare in joint operations. I ask that marine officers be included in the several joint boards and agencies. I ask it because they have a distinct and substantial contribution to make in the field of interservice coordination, a contribution born of their experience.

logistic problems involved in fighting on global scale. We all remember the confusion which resulted; the setting of seemingly impossible production schedules, the critical shortages of certain basic materials, and the frantic efforts to gear ourselves for the task ahead.

To coordinate the various aspects of our armament program, there were created certain wartime agencies which, beyond any doubt, saved the day for us. Born of necessity and nurtured on the bitter reality that their efforts would mean for us victory or defeat, these wartime agencies transformed the Nation from a state of unproductive confusion, to the "arsenal of democracy."

We have consolidated this lesson in the organization proposed in this bill. The provisions which establish the Munitions Board and the National Security Resources Board should insure for us the support of the industrial capacity of the Nation. Approved strategic and logistic plans initially prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be supported, through agencies such as the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board, and will be formulated in the light of all of the industrial, economic, and material considerations necessary to support these strategic plans.

This integration of our military requirements with our industrial capacity to support these requirements is an important feature of the bill. We seek to eliminate harmful duplication between the services.

Our attention is definitely focused on the future in the provision for a Research and Development Board. We must assure that our weapons will be at least as good as those likely to be used by our enemies. This bill, by setting up an organization to control scientific research as it relates to our national security, will give us that assurance.

The Research and Development Board will do more than its name implies. Scientific research for the fighting services will be conducted under its cognizance, and the results therefrom will be translated into new weapons and new tactics. The research programs of the three service departments will be coordinated and allocation of responsibility for specific programs shall be made among them.

The provision for an adequate agency for intelligence is further indication that this bill looks to the future. It would establish an organization known as the Central Intelligence Agency, charged with responsibility for collection of information from all available sources, including Government agencies, such as the State Department and the FBI, evaluation of that information, and dissemination thereof to all interested organizations. This plan is intended to secure complete coverage of the wide field of intelligence and should minimize duplication of effort.

The bill provides that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, may be either a civilian or a commissioned officer of the armed forces. In this provision the bill acknowledges that military intelligence is a composite of authenticated and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces establishment of a possible enemy, but also his industrial capacity, racial traits, religious beliefs, and other related aspects.

I have touched only briefly on the features of the bill. Vice Admiral Sherman, who participated in its drafting, will present to you a detailed analysis of its provisions.

In my opinion, this is a more effective security. I recommend.

The CHAIRMAN: That we later call Admiral Carney. I meet with him next week sometime.

Admiral, I remember history before the war, one time the first president I think last year, the approval.

Can you, either by name what features position in the Navy?

Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Staff who is the CHAIRMAN. A single chief, in this bill.

Admiral Nimitz, I have mentioned yes the war and realized Chiefs of Staff was where prompt decision I realized that I had the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A tactical command tactical decisions which and pressure does not strategic plans.

The CHAIRMAN: Not such a Joint Chiefs of Staff directly to the Joint Air Force, and there is it not?

Admiral Nimitz: The CHAIRMAN: Not Joint Chiefs of Staff manual? Is that not Admiral Nimitz?

President. The general matters, the theater and directives of the.

The CHAIRMAN: Do go through the Secret to the President, the

Admiral Nimitz: I consider the Command object of the single Secret that no matter what relieved of his constant Navy; and it is my constant will exercise just as much



Are you willing to support inclusion in the bill of the basic functions of naval aviation as enunciated by you?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Are you then willing to incorporate the basic functions of the Marine Corps?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By the same token, Admiral, if you start with the naval aviation and the Marine Corps, then necessarily you must put all of the wording, let us say, of the functions of all branches of the Armed Forces into it.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir.

And I would like to come back to the point that if it is attempted to do that too extensively and too exactly, it could have a very undesirable effect for the future.

Senator BYRD. But you do not consider your definition of the basic functions of naval aviation, or the Marine Corps to be too extensive. You regard that as a minimum, do you not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. And I think there is a clear difference as to naval aviation, because the effort may be made for the Air Force to take over naval aviation. And I have said before and repeat now, that I do not intend to vote for any bill that will not protect naval aviation; likewise, that will not protect the Marine Corps.

I think General Eisenhower, as I recall it, said something about the fact that it was his thought that the Marine Corps should be part of the landing force, or part of the Army; I have forgotten his exact language. But I regard the Marine Corps as absolutely essential in case of war, as I regard naval aviation as being absolutely essential to the Navy.

And you, as a naval officer, I know, will agree with me on that.

I am not going to depend upon any Executive order to outline those basic functions. I agree that we cannot go into detail, necessarily, about the other functions of the Navy or the other functions of the Army. But I do think those two basic functions should be incorporated into this bill, and I wanted to get your opinion as to whether you saw any objection to that.

Admiral SHERMAN. I agree with General Eisenhower's statement when he was testifying: That there would be no objection to putting in the basic functions of the services.

Senator BYRD. But is it not true that General Eisenhower said something else, at some other time, in regard to the Marine Corps, as to changing the present functions of the Marine Corps. Is that not correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, General Eisenhower's concept of the status and purpose of the Marine Corps was not the same as mine, during one period.

Senator BYRD. That was one thing I wanted to clear up. As far as I am concerned, I would like to see that in the bill.

Senator TYDINGS. Admiral, I do not want to revert to another subject, and maybe you would prefer to bring it up in the regular course. But looking at this proposed chart (See chart, facing p. 153) of the way that the unification will be carried out under the bill, when you get down to the Central Intelligence Agency, which certainly is one

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the most important of all of the functions set forth in the bill, I notice that it reports directly to the President and does not seem to have any line running to the War Department, or the Navy Department, or to the Secretary for Air. And I was wondering if that rather excluded position, you might say, was a wholesome thing.

It seems to me that that Central Intelligence Agency ought to have more direct contact with the Army and the Navy and the Air Force; and as I see it on the chart here, it is pretty well set aside and goes only to the President. What is the reason for that?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, this diagram shows the primary control of the Central Intelligence Agency through the National Security Council which, of course, is responsible to the President. But, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, by its detailed directive, takes information in from the military services and also supplies them with information.

In other words, it is a staff agency and controlled through the National Security Council, which is supported by the military services, and, in turn, supports them.

Senator TYDINGS. It seems to me that of course they would diffuse such information as a matter of orderly procedure to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as they collected the information and as they deemed it pertinent. But I would feel a little more secure about it if there were a line running from that agency to the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Air Force, rather than have it go up through the President and back again. Because the President is a rather busy man, and while he has control over it, one of its functions, it seems to me, ought to be to have a closer tie-in with the three services than the chart indicates.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, that is a defect in the diagram. Actually, the Security Council, placed directly over it, has members of the three departments, the Secretary of National Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, who collaborates very closely with Military and Naval Intelligence, and there are a good many other cross-relationships.

Senator TYDINGS. I realize that, but even so, I think intelligence is about as important a part of running a war as there is, as I know you will agree. And it is rather set off there by itself, and is only under the President; which is all right for general direction purposes, but I do not feel satisfied in having it over there without some lines running to the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Air Force, even though that might follow and they might do it anyhow.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, in a further development of this chart, we might show a line of collaboration and service, and so on, extending from the Central Intelligence Agency to the three departments, and to these others.

Senator TYDINGS. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, anyway.

Admiral SHERMAN. They serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of fact. We have a Central Intelligence in the Policy Council of the Research and Development Board at the present time.

Senator TYDINGS. If you ever do another chart, will you do me the favor of connecting that up with those three Departments and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Because it looks like it is set up in that way to advise the President, more than to advise the services and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; with opinion.

Admiral SHERMAN. The primary line of information from the President is situational reasons.

Senator TYDINGS. Is there some way that information from the War Department, Navy, and Air Force can be put into the Central Intelligence Agency?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is one thing. And as this is set up, it is more or less detached.

Admiral SHERMAN. The Navy is now

Senator BYRD. The Central Intelligence

Agency is commissioned off the United States Air

Force. Is that the intent of the bill?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do not think so. Section 1, although it is very broad, is appointed to the various safeguards.

Senator BYRD. Is it appointed?

Admiral SHERMAN. Senator BYRD. It is worded is certain.

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that the language it says, with the President, there is a life, or vice

Senator TYDINGS. I think, under the case set up here, separating the services

from it to you and the Department in the

work; that this Central Intelligence Department and the three Departments

have all off to itself, but it would something for the

Admiral SHERMAN. The language as to

Chiefs of Staff; which, of course, is not the intention of it at all, in my opinion.

Admiral SHERMAN. We tried, in this particular chart, to show only the primary line of control, with the exception of the one dotted line from the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is there for constitutional reasons.

Senator TYRINGS. Well, I hope that my comments will cause us to find some way that we can make sure that someone will offer an amendment from the War Department or the Navy Department that the Intelligence Agency is to have direct tie-in with the Joint Chiefs and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Otherwise, we may have another Pearl Harbor controversy, with the question arising, "Who got the information?" And the reply, "It was not transmitted."

That is one thing that should not happen again.

And as this is set up, it would lend the layman the opinion that it was more or less detached, rather than an integral part of the three services.

Admiral SHERMAN. I can assure you, sir, that the Central Intelligence-Navy is now serving us very effectively.

Senator BYRD. I see, Admiral, that in the section relating to the Central Intelligence Agency on page 20, you provide that—

any commissioned officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air Force may be appointed to the office of Director.

Is it the intent that he shall be a military man?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is not the intent of that language, sir, and I do not think this bill does require that. Section 202 (b) is permissive. Section 202 (a) provides that there be a director; 202 (b), although it is very lengthy, provides that a commissioned officer may be appointed to that office. And then there is considerable language which safeguards his position in the military service in that event.

Senator BYRD. Do you construe from that that a civilian could be appointed?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Would it not be better to make that clear? The way it is worded is certainly persuasive, if not definitely controlling.

Admiral SHERMAN. Since this is not the first time it has come up, I think that the language of the bill would be improved if, in 202 (a), where it says, with reference to the director, "to be appointed by the President," there were added such a phrase as "from military or civilian life," or vice versa. I think that would clarify it.

Senator TYRINGS. Admiral, that is an awfully short bit of explanation, under the caption "Central Intelligence Agency," the way it is set up here, separately, to be appointed by the President, and superseding the services now run by the Army and the Navy, I respectfully submit to you and to General Norstad that it might be wise to put an amendment in there, in order to make certain that the thing is understood; that this Central Intelligence Agency shall service the three Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and have some tie-in with the three Departments, rather than to leave it hanging up there on a limb all off to itself. I do not think that would change anything materially, but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are setting up something for the purposes for which we conceive it to be set up.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I would like to make a comment on the language as to the Central Intelligence Agency.

At one time in the draft for 2002/08/23, CIA-RDP90-00610R00010001-3  
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 Central Intelligence Agency in the manner that it should be covered by law.

Senator TYDINGS. Admiral, my point is simply this: That under the wording as to the Central Intelligence Agency which begins on page 20 and ends at the top of page 22, it deals more or less with consolidation and not with the duties that devolve upon that office.

It seems to me there is a void in the bill there that ought to be eliminated.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, we considered the matter of trying to cover the Central Intelligence Agency adequately, and we found that that matter, in itself, was going to be a matter of legislation of considerable scope and importance.

Senator TYDINGS. A separate bill?

Admiral SHERMAN. A separate bill. And after consultation with General Vandenberg, we felt it was better in this legislation only to show the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council, and then leave to separate legislation the task of a full and thorough development of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator TYDINGS. Well, now, for the record, is it safe for this committee to assume that during this session it is likely that a bill will come along dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency in the particulars that we have had under discussion?

Admiral SHERMAN. It is my understanding that that will take place.

The CHAIRMAN. How about that, General Vandenberg?

General VANDENBERG (Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief, Central Intelligence Agency). The enabling act is prepared, but we do not want to submit that until we have reason for it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. To carry out that point, look at subparagraph (c), sections (1) and (2). The bill does talk about functions there. It does take up certain functions that are now in existence and transfers them to this agency.

If you are going to take up any functions, let me ask you, to follow up your question, should you not take up all the functions, or leave out that subsection (c) in some way?

Senator TYDINGS. What happens under the bill, it seems to me, is that the consolidation itself takes place, but the services which are to be performed, and by whom they are to be performed, and for whom they are to be performed, are not very clearly set out. And I imagine it would be better in a separate bill. But I did not know the separate bill was coming, and in looking over the bill, it seemed to me to deal very shortly with a very important operation.

So your question and mine probably both would be answered in the new bill that is coming along.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The only point, to try to carry out what you said: It does mention some functions here, but does not mention all the functions.

Senator TYDINGS. And it deals with consolidation of functions.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It takes over certain functions not now in existence, if you will read subparagraph (c) there.

Senator TYDINGS. That is what I mean.

Admiral SHERMAN. The intent of this language was merely to transfer the duties of the existing intelligence agency to the Se-

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group as it is now constituted, by a letter directive of the President,  
over to the authority.

I would suggest that it might be beneficial to take the existing  
letter directive under which the Central Intelligence Agency is  
functioning now, and insert it in the record. Because that letter  
will clarify this whole matter.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time the committee hears General Van-  
denberg, I am sure the General will bring with him that letter and  
we will have that in at the start of those hearings.

Senator ROBERTSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.  
In connection with making this more definite and certain, I feel  
that this should be done in this bill:

I think the question of Naval Aviation should be set forth much  
more clearly and should be a congressional decision, making it a  
matter for the Congress to decide, or to determine in this bill, what  
are the functions of the various three arms, if you wish to call  
them that, of the service.

There is a very great difference of opinion among the Navy men  
and among the Air Force men, particularly, and among the Army  
also, as to the aviation points of this bill; as to how much aviation  
will actually go to Navy; and as to the status of the Marine Corps.

But I think the Congress should set that up very clearly in this  
bill.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, we are under a very great handicap  
here.

Practically every witness that we have had before us and that, as  
far as I can see, we will have, is in favor of this bill.

The very fact that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of  
the Navy, and the President have more or less agreed to this bill,  
agreed to sponsor this bill, really is a notification to every man in  
the armed services that that is the department of the various armed  
services, and there must be no statements or words issued against  
it; and I feel that the Navy has carried that out to the letter.

I am sorry that I cannot say the same for the Air Force.

I would like to read into the record at this time, from the Wash-  
ington Post of Thursday, March 20, 1947, a statement by a columnist,  
headed "End of the Marines." [Reading:]

Interesting light on the future of the Marine Corps was given by Brig. Gen.  
Frank Armstrong in an off-the-record talk before a group of naval officers at  
a dinner tendered by Norfolk, Va., businessmen.

General Armstrong, who is part Indian, and who had a fine record in  
training B-29 crews, really let his hair down regarding the future role of  
the Army Air Forces and the Marines, as follows:

"You gentlemen had better understand that the Army Air Force is tired  
of being a subordinate outfit, and is no longer going to be a subordinate  
outfit. It was a predominant force during the war. It is going to be a  
predominant force during the peace, and you might as well make up your  
minds, whether you like it or not that we do not care whether you like it or  
not: The Army Air Force is going to run the show. You, the Navy, are not  
going to have anything but a couple of carriers which are ineffective anyway,  
and they will probably be sunk in the first battle.

"Now, as for the Marines, you know what the Marines are. They are a  
small, fouled-up army talking navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines  
in the Regular Army and make efficient soldiers out of them. The Navy is  
going to send up by only supplying the requirements of the Army, Air, and  
Ground Forces too. The Army is going to take over Norfolk. We are here



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## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

now, and we are going to stay. We know this is a Navy town and a Navy hang-out, but the Army Air is still going to stay, and we are going to take over."

Senator TYDINGS. There is a man who has no pride in his own branch of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that the chairman of the committee remembers that article, an article by Drew Pearson, and I would like to ask General Norstad for the Army to ascertain if there was any record taken of that talk made by Brigadier General Armstrong, and if there was a record made of that talk which he gave, the committee would like to have it.

Senator ROBERTSON. I would like to ask the same question of Admiral Sherman—if the Navy has any report on that meeting.

Senator BRIDGES. I would like to ask that General Armstrong be brought here as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman will be glad to sit when any of the other members of the committee would like to sit to hear General Armstrong.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as that happened in Norfolk, I would like to second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your statement, Admiral.

Admiral SHERMAN. On January 20 work was started on drafting legislation in accord with the above agreement. Our task was to achieve a draft satisfactory to the War and Navy Departments and subsequently to assist in adjusting it satisfactorily to the other interested executive agencies of the Government.

The bill now before you is the product of that collaboration. It is in many respects a compromise of views initially divergent. I believe that it is an equitable compromise, one which will work, one which is in the interests of our national security, and one which will increase the effectiveness of our national defense. It is my belief that economies would eventually result from the proposed organization, although actual dollar savings may not be great except during a period of large procurement or large expansion.

To my mind, the greatest immediate benefits to be derived from the proposed legislation would be the unity of military concepts, the unity of purpose, and the unity of effort, which should result from the organization as proposed, and from putting an end to contention and controversy over the unification question.

I want to repeat that the bill represents part—the agreement on functions is the other part—of an over-all accord achieved from divergent points of view. Although the areas of divergencies have been narrowed during recent months, any one section of the bill may still represent a concession by one service to another. It is not to be expected that the services will give unanimous support to each section of the bill by itself.

It has been long apparent that any national security organization should be so constituted and empowered as to fit harmoniously into the existing framework of our Government. Study of the principles under which our American institutions have been successful shows that there are two things which these institutions all have in common, whether they are institutions in the Government, in business, in industry, or in the professions.

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have given powers of decision to the present chairman since neither Secretary could make decisions between the services. Those powers of decision would now pass to the Secretary of National Defense.

Section 201 provides for a National Security Council, an agency long felt necessary, and one which was proposed in the Secretary's letter of May 31, 1946, under the name "Council of Common Defense." This is an agency which has existed in an informal and embryo form for a considerable period. During the period before the war and extending into the early part of the war, there was a so-called Liaison Committee which included the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

For over 2 years now the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy have been meeting informally each week as the so-called Committee of Three to coordinate action in matters of mutual concern. Recently the Secretary of State has assigned a permanent secretary to that committee.

Current events indicate clearly the necessity for an organization on at least the Cabinet level to make decisions based on sound estimates as to the most effective manner in which our military and financial resources can be applied. In the future we may anticipate that, as during the past week, it will be necessary to consider the optimum use of the power, prestige, money, and other resources available to us for implementation of national policy.

The best results will be achieved only by continuous and exhaustive consideration of the problems involved, such consideration to be participated in by the heads of the State Department, the military departments, and one or more representatives of the branches of the Government concerned with our national resources.

The Central Intelligence Group provided for by section 202 exists now. This section assigns to the National Security Council the supervisory authority and responsibility now given by Executive order to a National Intelligence Authority which includes the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. It includes language which is permissive, but not mandatory, covering the possible assignment of a serving officer to the post of Director of Central Intelligence. It does not, however, bar the appointment of a civilian as Director.

I consider the Central Intelligence Agency to be a vital necessity under present world conditions. Its necessity will increase with our greater international responsibilities and as the power of sudden attack is amplified by further developments in long-range weapons and in weapons of mass destruction.

Section 203 provides for the National Resources Board, an agency intended to coordinate military, industrial, and civilian mobilization and to maintain and stabilize the civilian economy in time of war.

It should be distinctly noted that while the Munitions Board, dealing with essentially military requirements, is responsible to the Secretary of National Defense, the Resources Board is responsible to the President in its broader field embracing the entire civilian economy.

There must be both a Resources Board and a Munitions Board because two separate functions must be carried out in the field of national mobilization and logistics, which although interrelated, are on different levels—one on the political and national level, and the other on the strictly military level.

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millions of men in this war underwent—without coming to some pretty strong general conclusions about the way in which our national defense set-up should be established. I am not going into technicalities because I am not equipped to do that.

In fact, if there were any real differences of opinion between the officers of our Army and Navy who were charged with studying this matter, I would have declined your very courteous request to come here. I suppose I might have said something on the floor later on, and I would certainly have cast my vote along with the rest of the Senators, but if these Army and Navy men had not agreed on this proposition, I would not be before this committee at all. The fact, however, that they have agreed on a proposition to unify the services and have done so only after great soul searching and great difficulty, and great struggle of mind, makes me feel very strongly that any man is bold, indeed, to be the instrument which breaches that agreement. I mean, of course, who breaches that agreement because of any military considerations.

Senator McCARTHY. You speak of the Army and Navy agreement on this bill. I assume you are not referring to any agreement which would affect section 2 of this bill, are you, Senator, with respect to the power of the super Secretary especially over civilian life?

Senator LODGE. I am referring to the military phases.

Senator McCARTHY. Only to the military phases?

Senator LODGE. I thought this whole bill had been agreed to by the representatives of the Army and Navy.

Senator McCARTHY. I do not think you got my question. Forgetting about the strictly military phases of the bill, forgetting the phases of unification of the armed services and getting to those portions of the bill which have such additional powers on the part of this super Secretary over civilian life, when we get to those sections, then, you would not be influenced by the agreement between the Army and the Navy, would you?

Senator LODGE. No. I am influenced by an agreement between the Army and the Navy on everything that is of a military character. There are some things in this bill that are not of a purely military character which transcend the uniformed services.

The national resources portion of this bill, which I think is a very good one, incidentally does transcend entirely the scope of the uniformed services. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. May I call your attention to the fact that title 2 of this bill covers the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board, those three agencies. Mainly, they are set up as planning divisions.

The National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board reports directly to the President. The Central Intelligence Agency reports to the President. They do not report directly to the new Secretary provided in the bill.

Senator LODGE. That is right. I think that insofar as the National Security Council is concerned, that is largely a military question.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator LODGE. I think the Central Intelligence Agency has a military aspect to it, but of course it also has a strong foreign policy aspect to it.

I am not for the Navy; that it not only reflects the opinion of the Reserve officers but likewise the opinions of a large proportion of their brother officers in the regular service. I respectfully submit that the announced official policy of the Navy Department is not a true representation of the feeling of the officers within the Naval Establishment.

I urge this committee to delay immediate positive action on this bill and further I propose and urge the appointment of a commission of Reserve officers of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, and the Air Corps to study the unification of the armed services, drawing upon the wartime experiences of their Reserve brother officers to assist them in this study and giving to this committee its recommendation based on that study. I offer the fullest cooperation of RONS in conducting this survey.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bracken, the committee thanks you very much for your testimony. There are a lot of good thoughts in it.

I want you to know that the committee is not concluding the hearings as of today. There are quite a few more witnesses to be heard yet.

The committee has not closed the hearing of anyone whom they may decide to invite here to give further testimony.

Are there any questions? Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy?

Senator MCCARTHY. I have just one question.

Mr. Bracken, did your organization give any amount of study to the question of how much power this over-all head will have under the wording of this bill as it is presently worded?

Mr. BRACKEN. They have not given intensive study on that point; no. They feel intensive study should be given to that point.

Senator MCCARTHY. I gather from your statement, however, that you feel the language is so indefinite, it is rather impossible for any two fair-minded men presently to agree as to the power he does have.

Mr. BRACKEN. I do so feel; yes, sir. I think that the hearings before this committee have indicated the various witnesses differ in their opinion as to the authority of this man.

Senator MCCARTHY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bracken.

I offer for the record a letter received by me as chairman of the committee from A. W. Dulles, of New York City, dated April 25, together with a memorandum from Mr. Dulles, referring particularly to section 202 of Senate bill 758, having to do with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL,  
New York 5, April 25, 1947.

Hon. CHAN GURNEY,  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR GURNEY. With reference to previous correspondence relating to the Central Intelligence provisions of the services unification bill, I enclose a memorandum outlining my views on the subject in view of the fact that I am leaving tomorrow for Europe, to be gone about 4 weeks. In the event that I return prior to the termination of your hearings and you then wish me to appear in person, I shall be very glad to do so.

However, in the end clearly as I can the qu for an adequate Central Intelligence Agency has also been I turn in the executive I believe a copy of this sincerely yours,

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However, in the enclosed memorandum I have set forth as succinctly and as clearly as I can the quite definite views I have with regard to the requirements for an adequate Central Intelligence Agency.

As I have also been invited to appear before the House Committee on Expenditures in the executive departments, I am also sending Representative Clare Hoffman a copy of this memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

A. W. DULLES.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING SECTION 202 (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) OF THE BILL TO PROVIDE FOR A NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, SUBMITTED BY ALLEN W. DULLES, APRIL 23, 1947

I

To create an effective Central Intelligence Agency we must have in the key positions men who are prepared to make this a life work, not a mere casual occupation. Service in the Agency should not be viewed merely as a stepping stone to promotion in one of the armed services or other branches of the Government. The Agency should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job. They must find their reward primarily in the work itself, and in the service they render their Government, rather than in public acclaim.

Intelligence work in time of peace differs fundamentally from that in time of war. In time of war military channels and military facilities, and consequently military personnel, can effectively be employed in far greater measure than in peacetime. In time of peace intelligence with respect to foreign countries must come largely through civilian channels.

Because of its glamour and mystery overemphasis is generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, namely the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and by secret agents. During war this form of intelligence takes on added importance but in time of peace the bulk of intelligence can be obtained through overt channels, through our diplomatic and consular missions, and our military, naval, and air attachés in the normal and proper course of their work. It can also be obtained through the world press, the radio, and through the many thousands of Americans, business and professional men and American residents of foreign countries, who are naturally and normally brought in touch with what is going on in those countries. A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy. An important balance must be supplied by secret intelligence which includes what we now often refer to as "Magic."

II

I believe that the agency which is to be entrusted with assembling and analyzing intelligence should be predominantly civilian rather than military, and under civilian leadership.

Whoever takes the post of Director of Central Intelligence should make that his life work. If previously a military man, he should not look forward to resuming a position in one of the armed services. The same should be true of his top staff. Whatever may have been their previous professions, whether military or civilian, once they take high position in the central intelligence organization they should, if military, divest themselves of their rank as soldiers, sailors, or airmen and, as it were, "take the cloth" of the intelligence service.

The success of the FBI has been due not only to the ability of the director and the high qualities of his chief assistants, but to the fact that that director has been on that particular job for a sufficient period of years to build up public confidence, an esprit de corps in his organization, and a high prestige. We should



seek the same results for our intelligence service which will operate in the foreign field, and on items of foreign information.

I do not suggest that the legislation should lay down a hard and fast rule that the chief of the Intelligence Agency must come from civilian life. Certainly there are many men of military training who are competent to hold that job. But if a military man takes the job, he should operate from that time on as a civilian. Further, he must be assured, subject to good performance, a specified term of duty, which should be subject to extension as long as he carried out his task efficiently. Appointment as Chief of Central Intelligence should be somewhat comparable to appointment to high judicial office, and should be equally free from interference due to political changes. In fact, the duties the Chief will have to perform will call for the judicial temperament in high degree. An appointee must gain that critical faculty which can only come of long experience and profound knowledge to enable him to separate the wheat from the chaff in the volume of information which will pass through his office.

Of course, the Central Intelligence Agency should also have attached to it a substantial number of men from the armed forces as well as from civilian life, many of whom will not make it a life career but who can perform useful functions for a term of years.

Much of our thinking relating to an intelligence agency is colored by our recent dramatic war experiences. Intelligence work in time of peace will require other techniques, other personnel, and will have rather different objectives. The prime objectives today are not solely strategic or military, important as these may be. They are scientific—in the field of atomic energy, guided missiles, supersonic aircraft, and the like. They are political and social. We must deal with the problem of conflicting ideologies as democracy faces communism, not only in the relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the west, but in the internal political conflicts within the countries of Europe, Asia, and South America. For example, it may well be more important to know the trend of Russian communism and the views of individual members of the Polit Bureau than it would be to have information as to the locations of particular Russian divisions.

Having this conception of the task of a central intelligence agency, I am skeptical as to the wisdom or adequacy of the provisions in the bill to provide for a national defense establishment with respect to central intelligence. These provisions seem to me to set up what, in effect, is likely to become merely a coordinating agency for the military intelligence services, G-2, A-2, ONI. This is useful, and this function should be performed by the agency, but it is not enough.

The constant changes in the chiefs of the military intelligence services has crippled their efficiency and lessened their prestige. As these services are a part of a professional career, of which intelligence is only one segment (and too often it has been a stepchild), such changes are somewhat inevitable. But this precedent should not be carried over to the new Central Intelligence Agency. There provision must be made for permanence and continuity. And yet the Central Intelligence Authority, heretofore based on Presidential order, will have had three heads in the space of 1 short year. The two men who up to now have been the heads of that agency were both extremely able, devoted, and competent men, but no man can do much in this most difficult field in a few months. Constant change destroys the morale and prevents the long-range planning which must be the task of a properly functioning intelligence agency.

Hence I would recommend that any legislation provide long-term tenure for the Chief of the Agency, with the establishment of a precedent that his chief subordinates should also have that degree of permanence which is necessary to insure team play between the Chief and his immediate assistants. The Chief should not have men imposed upon him for political or other like reasons. He should have the right to pass upon his assistants. The legislation should provide that the Chief and his immediate assistants, so long as they are attached to the Central Intelligence Agency, should act in a civilian and not in a military capacity.

### III

Under the legislation as proposed, the Central Intelligence Agency is to operate under the National Security Council, the stated purpose of which is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of foreign and military policies, and to enable the military services and other agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security." This Council will have at least six members, and possibly more, subject to Presidential appointment. From its composition it will be largely military, although the Secretary

State will be a member. The burden of work in an effective working advisory attention to the Chief of the Agency, of which the Secretary will be the right respect will be represented on the Assistant Secretary's responsibility for the proper liaison executive.

In time of peace, the operations of the Department, even the Department of Intelligence can only deal with the Department and will come to the proposed in the of the military Department. This establishment. The nation.

The State Department Agency is a day-by-day of will do likewise. In any it is important it is to weigh the facts, the prejudices of the determined a policy to the policy nothing to do with must determine attack on Pearl. Included that the. Hitler thought provide any systematic stubbornness. we have created the policy make

Any Central intelligence collected gained through results of its of the most competent the intelligence Government of the Department. It is important this work through both the State relations are of Department—desirable, for be delegated the work in the would mean it should be coordinated Intelligence A

## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

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of State will be a member. If precedent is any guide, it seems unlikely, in view of the burden of work upon all the members of this Council, that it will prove to be an effective working body which will meet frequently, or which could give much supervisory attention to a central intelligence agency. It would seem preferable that the Chief of Central Intelligence should report, as at present, to a smaller body, of which the Secretary of State would be the chairman, and which would include the Secretary of National Defense, and a representative of the President, with the right reserved to the Secretaries of State and of National Defense to be represented on this small board by deputies, who should have at least the rank of Assistant Secretary. And this board must really meet and assume the responsibility for advising and counseling the Director of Intelligence, and assure the proper liaison between the Agency and these two Departments and the Executive.

## IV

In time of peace intelligence will probably be of more importance in the day-by-day operations of the Department of State than any other agency of the Government, even the Department of National Defense. Further, in time of peace, intelligence can only be properly collected if there are the closest working arrangements with the Department of State, as the bulk of the intelligence collected abroad will come through the facilities of that Department.

The proposed intelligence set-up in the draft legislation is overweighted on the side of the military department of the Government, as contrasted with the State Department. This is natural because it appears in a bill for our National Defense Establishment. This fact, however, should not blind us to the realities of the situation.

The State Department, irrespective of the form in which the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect and process its own information as a basis for the day-by-day conduct of its work. The armed services intelligence agencies will do likewise. But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. It should try to get at the hard facts on which others must determine policy. The warnings which might well have pointed to the attack on Pearl Harbor were largely discounted by those who had already concluded that the Japanese must inevitably strike elsewhere. The warnings which reportedly came to Hitler of our invasion of North Africa were laughed aside. Hitler thought he knew we didn't have the ships to do it. It is impossible to provide any system which will be proof against the human frailty of intellectual stubbornness. Every individual suffers from that. All we can do is to see that we have created the best possible mechanism to get the unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it there in time.

## V

Any Central Intelligence Agency (in addition to having access to the intelligence collected by the State Department and the armed services, to intelligence gained through intercepted messages, open and deciphered alike, and from the results of its own secret and over intelligence operations) must have a corps of the most competent men which this country can produce to evaluate and correlate the intelligence obtained, and to present it, in proper form, to the interested Government departments, in most cases to the State Department, in many cases to the Department of National Defense, or to both.

It is important to avoid splitting up and dissipating the personnel available for this work through having over-all specialized intelligence evaluating agencies in both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. If close working relations are established between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department—as is essential if the Agency is to function properly—it would seem desirable, for reasons of economy and efficiency, that the task of evaluation should be delegated to the Central Intelligence Agency without, of course, affecting the work in the geographical and other divisions of the State Department. This would mean that the specialized intelligence agency within the State Department should be coordinated with, or amalgamated into, the branch of the Central Intelligence Agency devoted to the analysis and evaluation of intelligence.

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## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

## VI

In addition to these basic considerations, the Central Intelligence Agency should have the following powers and attributes:

1. Control its own personnel but with the right to co-opt personnel from other departments of the Government, with the consent of the head of the department in question but without affecting the rank, civil-service status, or pay of the employee assigned for temporary duty.
2. Have its own appropriations but with the possibility of supplementing these appropriations from available funds of the Department of State or the Department of National Defense under conditions to be provided by law, in order to carry on certain special operations which may, from time to time, be deemed necessary by the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of National Defense.
3. Have exclusive jurisdiction to carry out secret intelligence operations.
4. Have access to all intelligence information relating to foreign countries received by all departments of the Government, including "Magic."
5. Be the recognized agency for dealing with the central intelligence agencies of other countries.
6. Have its operations and personnel protected by "official secrets" legislation which would provide adequate penalties for breach of security.

## VII

It has truthfully been said that intelligence is our first line of defense. The European countries more immediately exposed to danger in the past have realized this, and have spared no pains to develop adequate intelligence services. Among them the British have had signal success, and this success, in no small part, has been responsible for pulling them through periods of the direst danger. The British system has behind it a long history of quiet effective performance, based on a highly trained personnel with years of service and great technical ability. In this country we have the raw material for building the greatest intelligence service in the world. But to accomplish this we must make it a respectable, continuing, and adequately remunerated career. The personnel need not be very numerous. The operation of the service must be neither flamboyant nor overshadowed with the mystery and abracadabra which the amateur detective likes to assume. With the proper legislative backing, a correct technical set-up, and adequate leadership, all that is required for success is hard work, discriminating judgment, and common sense. Americans can be found who are not lacking in these qualities.

The CHAIRMAN. I also offer for the record a letter received by me as chairman of the committee from Francis M. Sullivan, of the Disabled American Veterans, dated April 23, 1947, together with the attached resolution.

DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS,  
April 23, 1947.

HON. CHAN GURNEY,  
Chairman of Senate Committee on Armed Services,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: I am taking the liberty of forwarding to you a copy of a resolution adopted by the Disabled American Veterans at our last national convention held in September 1946 at Portland, Oreg., which urges the coordination and unification of our armed services.

I shall appreciate it if this is incorporated into the record of the hearings on the proposed unification of the armed services.

Thanking you, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANCIS M. SULLIVAN,  
National Director of Legislation.

## RESOLUTION

Whereas the experience of World War II demonstrated that combined operations under unified command contributed greatly to the effectiveness of American and Allied armed forces in all theaters; and

Whereas in consequence the United States will in single item, the effect therefore, be it

Resolved by the Veterans in session the interest of nation under a single Department Air Forces would be

Resolved, That the single civilian secret a Secretary for the Forces responsible to

Resolved, That a President, to coordinate security, and to coordinate State, the Secretary a National Resources

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Resolved, That every by the Eightieth Congress

The CHAIRMAN: sibly tomorrow of (Thereupon, a call of the chair

## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

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Whereas in consequence of combined operations under unified command the United States will necessarily function in a single global theater of war as a single item, the effectiveness of which will depend on unity of command: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Twenty-fifth National Convention of the Disabled American Veterans in session at Portland, Oreg., this 5th day of September 1946, That in the interest of national security Congress be urged to unify the armed services under a single Department of Common Defense, in which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces would be coequal;*

*Resolved, That the unified Department of Common Defense be headed by a single civilian secretary who would be a member of the President's Cabinet, with a Secretary for the Army, a Secretary for the Navy, and a Secretary for the Air Forces responsible to him;*

*Resolved, That a Council of Common Defense be created, responsible to the President, to coordinate all military and related activities essential to the national security, and to consist of the Secretary of Common Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretaries for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, and the Chairman of a National Resources Board;*

*Resolved, That under the Secretary of Common Defense the three armed services be completely coordinated for planning, operations, research, intelligence, budgeting, and administration, including personnel and supply, both for maximum effectiveness as a team and to prevent waste, duplication, overlapping of function, and unnecessary expenditure for the national security; and*

*Resolved, That every effort be made to obtain the enactment of a unification bill by the Eightieth Congress in conformity with this resolution.*

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now stand in recess until possibly tomorrow or Friday at the call of the Chair.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)

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Colonel OLIVER. No. We are especially particularly concerned with section 202, which has to do with the Central Intelligence Agency, as a result of a study made by members of the Reserve Officers Association, who were intelligence officers during the war.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then you are confining your remarks to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Colonel OLIVER. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And these remarks you have made about a single department or a merger are perhaps incidental to your suggestion on this other section?

Colonel OLIVER. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that we should not put much weight on that thought.

Colonel OLIVER. That is correct. However, I will be very happy to supply the committee with a copy of the resolution.

Senator ROBERTSON. Thank you.

(The resolutions referred to are as follows:)

RESOLUTION No. 3, PASSED AT THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONVENTION RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, CHICAGO, ILL., JUNE 3, 1946

## UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

Whereas the President of the United States has heretofore recommended to Congress integration of the armed forces of the United States to include Army, Navy, and Air Forces under a single department of national defense, and

Whereas various departments have not been able to agree on a plan implementing such recommendation, and

Whereas it is the unanimous recommendation of the departments of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States that such a single department will effect unity of command, simplify personnel requirements, enhance consolidation of intelligence agencies, facilitate combined operations, economize supply procurement, and realize the maximum employment of all potentials to ensure national security: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Reserve Officers Association of the United States in convention assembled, That we endorse wholeheartedly the principles of unification of the armed forces of the United States with equal status of our Army, Navy, and Air Corps under a single department of national defense; and

That a copy of this resolution be sent to each Member of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States.

RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., NOVEMBER 23, 1946

Resolved, That the principle of the unification of all the armed forces into a single department of the armed forces with separate status for land, sea, and air forces is approved.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Mr. Riddell, we will be glad to hear you.

## STATEMENT OF COL. RICHARD J. RIDDELL, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Colonel RIDDELL. Gentlemen, the Reserve Officers Association feels that the backbone of our intelligence system should continue to be the intelligence agencies already existing in the various Government departments, particularly the State, War, and Navy Departments.

Over a period of facilities to coming of each day well over 90 per cent security is current mental intelligence.

The problem of intelligence system the activities of that each collect intelligence which form this committee of common sense a central intelligence command that the intelligence Agency as Security Act of entirety of section 202 of the Intelligence Security Act of 1949, the principle of

We feel that the administratively dependent any interdepartmental be established by his Executive order.

We believe in intelligence to and indirectly such of direct.

However, we administratively in section 202 of national intelligence policy advisers, the needs of the their administrative

Such control estimates to support This would tend to product.

We feel that the National Intelligence for intelligence (I-2) supplies in to what intelligence the command therefore, that under the President although it should later.

We further if be appointed by the President Director of Central Intelligence



Over a period of years, these departments have developed staffs and facilities to collect and evaluate the intelligence required for the making of each department's policies and decisions. It is estimated that well over 90 percent of the foreign intelligence related to the national security is currently being collected and evaluated by these departmental intelligence agencies.

The problem of assuring the development of an effective national intelligence system therefore becomes one primarily of coordinating the activities of these departmental intelligence agencies to insure that each collects, evaluates, and disseminates that share of national intelligence which is the responsibility of that department. To perform this coordinating function, as well as to perform certain services of common concerns which are more efficiently accomplished centrally, a central intelligence agency is required. However, we strongly recommend that the proposed provisions governing the Central Intelligence Agency as contained in section 202 of the proposed National Security Act of 1947, should be fundamentally changed and that the entirety of section 202 should be redrafted, bearing in mind the following principles.

We feel that the Central Intelligence Agency should not be administratively dependent on any department of the Government or on any interdepartmental authority or council, but rather that it should be established directly under the President, possibly as a portion of his Executive office.

We believe indeed that its prime mission should be to supply intelligence to and thus serve the National Security Council, and secondarily such other departments and agencies as the President may direct.

However, we feel that to establish the Central Intelligence Agency administratively under the National Security Council, as proposed in section 202 (a), would be tantamount to placing the production of national intelligence under the control of the President's national policy advisers. National intelligence should be designed to meet the needs of the national policy advisers, while not being subject to their administrative control.

Such control would leave the door open to slanting intelligence estimates to support preconceived national policy recommendations. This would tend to destroy the objectivity of the national intelligence product.

We feel that the Central Intelligence Agency bears the same relation to the National Security Council as a military G-2 staff section for intelligence bears to a military G-3 staff section for operations. G-2 supplies intelligence to G-3 and receives direction from G-3 as to what intelligence estimates are required, but G-2 takes orders from the commanding general, not from G-3. We feel very strongly, therefore, that the Central Intelligence Agency should be directly under the President, and not under the National Security Council, although it should be primarily designed to supply intelligence to the latter.

We further feel that the Director of Central Intelligence should be appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and administratively responsible only to the President. We feel strongly that the Director of Central Intelligence should be a civilian, because he

should represent all aspects of the Government, not merely those concerned with the military, naval, or air elements of our armed forces.

It seems quite in keeping with the American way of life and with the traditional American principle of requiring even the Secretaries of War and Navy to be civilians.

Concerning section 202 (b), we therefore feel that, should a member of the armed forces be elected to become Director of Central Intelligence, he should be required to serve as a civilian. We agree with the proposed annual salary of \$14,000 for the Director of Central Intelligence.

We believe that a board should be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. This Central Intelligence Advisory Board should consist of the heads of the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces, and of other departmental intelligence agencies as needed. Similar interdepartmental groups of specialists from these agencies should be established as needed at working levels within the framework of the Central Intelligence Agency to formulate plans, programs, and procedures on each phase of national intelligence activity and to collaborate on specific intelligence problems.

We believe that the Central Intelligence Agency should have its own budget, included as a part of the Executive Office budget, and classified confidential or higher. The Director of Central Intelligence should have complete control over its personnel, who should be a select group of professionally trained specialists. Such salaries and conditions of service should be later prescribed in enabling legislation as will attract to this agency the best qualified personnel.

What is more important, in view of the confusion which has apparently surrounded the activities of the Central Intelligence group and its relationship to other Government intelligence agencies during the past 14 months, we further believe that the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency should be carefully delineated and elaborated so as to prescribe for it the following functions:

(a) To coordinate the intelligence activities of all Government agencies to insure that there is maximum effective coverage of all pertinent subjects concerning foreign countries. For this purpose—

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency shall work out with the intelligence agencies concerned the proper responsibilities of each in the fields of collection and research in order to insure the maximum concentration of effort by each agency on subjects of primary concern to its department, to reduce to a minimum the duplication of effort between agencies and to prevent any omission in coverage of essential subjects.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency shall establish procedures to insure the free flow of intelligence from each agency to all other interested agencies.

(b) To perform such services of common concern to other intelligence agencies as can best be performed centrally or which are not a proper activity of any one agency, including the sole operation of an organization to collect such information anywhere abroad as can be collected only by special means, and to conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States.

(c) To prepare policy decisions... exclusive committee.

(1) In the past Intelligence Agency interested departments. Senator McClellan that the bill sets Intelligence Agency, or it forth?

Colonel Rimm: be changed, sir.

Senator McClellan: that the bill sets Intelligence Agency.

Colonel Rimm: (2) In the past Intelligence Agency from the estimate intelligence agencies.

(3) Since the personnel, the Central Intelligence Agency is small but highly

We further charged with a appropriate age security, but the counterintelligence

Regarding records, and we should be transfer the functions of fined as above.

Senator SALT: questions which

You say that President, and be in this set-up

While you have provisions against an advisory group summarizes their recommendations appropriate or

Now, the President's Council is meritorious, the Central Intelligence group, or is a which to make

Therefore, Intelligence Agency, ment, if that I disagree with

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(c) To prepare such estimates as are required as a basis for national policy decisions of a politico-military nature and transcending the exclusive competence of any particular department.

(1) In the preparation of these strategic estimates the Central Intelligence Agency shall make full use of estimates prepared by the interested departmental intelligence agencies.

Senator McCARTHY. Do I understand that you are recommending that the bill sets forth the detailed functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, or do I correctly understand you that the bill is to set it forth?

Colonel RIDDELL. We believe that the entire context of 202 should be changed, sir, according to the principles outlined in this paper.

Senator McCARTHY. Do I understand that you are recommending that the bill set forth the specific detailed functions of the Central Intelligence Agency? Is that your recommendation?

Colonel RIDDELL. Yes, sir.

(2) In the presentation of these strategic estimates the Central Intelligence Agency shall indicate any differences in evaluation therein from the estimates prepared by the contributing departmental intelligence agencies.

(3) Since these are based on full use of departmental research personnel, the Central Intelligence Agency need have only a relatively small but highly qualified research staff of its own.

We further feel that the Central Intelligence Agency should be charged with advising and supplying pertinent information to the appropriate agencies charged with the responsibility for the domestic security, but that it should have no police functions and no domestic counterintelligence functions.

Regarding section 202 (c), we believe that the personnel, property records, and unexpended funds of the Central Intelligence Group should be transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, but that the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency should be newly defined as above.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Colonel, I would like to ask about one or two questions which seem to me very fundamental on what you have said.

You say that this agency should be the G-2, so to speak, of the President, and should not be under the G-3, which you interpret to be in this set-up the National Security Council.

While you have been discussing this subject, I have read hastily the provisions again of the National Security Council. That is purely an advisory group. The Council itself under clause (c) which summarizes their duties, "The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require."

Now, the President is the operating head. This National Security Council is merely an advisory group to the President, and as I see it, the Central Intelligence Agency as here set up is an advisory group, or is a method by which they can obtain their knowledge on which to make recommendations to the President.

Therefore, I would say that they should have a Central Intelligence Agency, rather than these diversified agencies in each department, if that theory is correct. Do you agree with that, or do you disagree with it?

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Colonel RIDDELL. I disagree in one important respect, sir, in line with my statement. The duty of the Council, as outlined on page 19, is to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

I would like to repeat, sir, that the National Security Council, it occurs to me, will have to depend almost entirely for any assessment leading to a determination of national policy on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator MCCARTHY. Putting it another way, would they not have to depend almost entirely upon your Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Let me ask just one more question.

How do you, with your interpretation of this act, particularly with relation to section 202, which is the section you discuss, correlate your remarks with the first witness who said that the Reserve officers were in favor of a single department. If you are going to have a single department, why have three or four separate intelligence agencies?

Colonel RIDDELL. That is precisely what we wish to do away with, sir. We think that the Central Intelligence Agency—you understand, Senator, that the intelligence agencies now operating within the framework of our Government are in reality departmental intelligence agencies. We are thinking of this thing in terms of national policy, as opposed to foreign policy, as opposed to military policy or naval policy, economic policy, or any other policy.

We feel that national policy decisions must take into account the production of all of the departments none of whom are able on their own to arrive at any determination of national policy.

Whether that answers your question or not, I do not know. We propose to utilize the existing facilities to the tune of about 90 percent.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Are you through?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have no further questions.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Senator McCarthy.

Senator MCCARTHY. I am not sure that I understood your proposal. I assume that we agree that the success or failure of your military is largely dependent upon a good efficient intelligence department, is that right?

Colonel RIDDELL. Sir, I think when you say military it is using it in a very narrow sense.

Senator MCCARTHY. Let us use it in that sense. Let us narrow it down to the military during times of war.

Colonel RIDDELL. I do not quite get the meaning of your question, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. An efficient intelligence unit is of tremendous importance, of course, to the military?

Colonel RIDDELL. Yes.

Senator MCCARTHY. Is it your thought that the intelligence unit should be in no way directly responsible to your military heads?

Colonel RIDDELL. Exactly, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. And I did not following your reasoning there. I am very interested in getting it.

Colonel RIDDELL. We feel that the Central Intelligence Agency should be an agency responsible to the President, who is the Commander

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in Chief of the Army in time of war and in

Now, the product the product of Army

ments of Government. Senator MCCARTHY will be of importance the Navy, the Secret Defense, right?

Colonel RIDDELL.

Senator MCCARTHY reasoning at all.

is composed of the Secretary of the Navy

Air Force. Those exclusively concern

Colonel RIDDELL.

means.

Senator MCCARTHY follow that your Commission that group?

Colonel RIDDELL.

parallel echelon.

Senator MCCARTHY have over the Central

Colonel RIDDELL.

Senator MCCARTHY

Senator ROBERTSON

Our time is limited

day morning.

The CHAIRMAN.

a letter dated May

the United States



in Chief of the Army and the Navy, responsible only to the President in time of war and in time of peace.

Now, the product of the Central Intelligence Agency is necessarily the product of Army, Navy, State, Commerce, of all of the departments of Government, and not just the military.

Senator McCARTHY. The product of the Central Intelligence Agency will be of importance mainly to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the National Defense, right?

Colonel RIDDELL. Right.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, with that in mind, I do not follow your reasoning at all. You understand that the National Security Council is composed of the Secretary of State, Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Air Force. Those are the departments that are vitally and almost exclusively concerned with intelligence. Am I right?

Colonel RIDDELL. That is not quite right, sir; not exclusively by any means.

Senator McCARTHY. I say almost exclusively. Then does it not follow that your Central Intelligence Agency should be working under that group?

Colonel RIDDELL. We do not feel so, sir; we feel it should be on a parallel echelon.

Senator McCARTHY. What control do you think the JCS should have over the Central Intelligence Agency?

Colonel RIDDELL. None whatsoever.

Senator McCARTHY. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. We appreciate your coming here. Our time is limited, and the committee will be in recess until Tuesday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to have inserted in the record at this point a letter dated May 12, 1947, from the Reserve Officers Association of the United States:

RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington 8, D. C., May 12, 1947.

HON. CHAN GURNEY,  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,  
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: At the suggestion of Senator Leverett Saltonstall, following our testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 2, 1947, a conference was held the same day with Rear Adm. R. H. Hillenkoetter, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, his predecessor, concerning section 232 of the proposed National Security Act of 1947.

Admiral Hillenkoetter and General Vandenberg brought with them to this conference the following two officers: Brig. Gen. E. K. Wright, who is Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; and Capt. R. K. Davis, United States Navy, of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The following two Reserve officers joined me in representing the Reserve Officers Association of the United States at this conference: Lt. Col. Paul A. Neuland, of the Military Intelligence Reserve, who is president of the Intelligence chapter of the Department of the District of Columbia, ROA; and Lt. Col. Robert L. Clifford, of the Field Artillery Reserve, who, like myself, is a member of the above-mentioned Intelligence chapter. Incidentally, this chapter initiated the proposals concerning national intelligence which are now supported by the entire Reserve Officers Association.

The recommendations submitted by the Reserve Officers Association were discussed at length during this conference. The basic principles which should

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govern the organization and conduct of national intelligence were thoroughly aired. The discussion was very fruitful and profitable in achieving greater clarity as to the means believed necessary to reach the objective for which both groups present at the discussion are working, namely, the achievement of greater national security through the development of adequate and effective national intelligence facilities.

It was found that both groups see eye to eye on the important principles which are basic to the future conduct of national intelligence in this country. Both groups agree that legislative support for the Central Intelligence Agency is urgently necessary, so much so that a separate bill providing for it should immediately be passed by this Congress if serious delay is anticipated in the passage of the proposed National Security Act of 1947 in its entirety. The Reserve Officers Association feels strongly that delay in giving statutory authority for the Central Intelligence Agency not only will prolong the current impasse in recruiting intelligence specialists, who are reluctant to embrace this career unless appropriate legislation guarantees them an attractive future, but will also occasion serious dangers to our national security because of failure to provide more than a temporary and ephemeral authority for such an essential guardian thereof.

As a result of the above-mentioned conference and of a second discussion which Colonel Neuland and I were privileged to have with the Director of Central Intelligence and his deputy yesterday morning, we herewith submit this letter and the enclosed document as a supplement to the testimony, given by me before the Senate Armed Services Committee on behalf of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, on May 2, 1947. The enclosed document is a proposed redraft of section 202 of S. 758, the bill under discussion. It embodies the ideas which, after our two discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence and his associates, are felt by the Reserve Officers Association of the United States to be of such fundamental importance and so absolutely essential that they should not be omitted from the basic legislation on this subject.

Certain proposals concerning the Central Intelligence Agency as presented in our initial testimony will be found omitted from the enclosed redraft. These original proposals are neither withdrawn nor retracted. It is intended that they be brought up again when enabling legislation is under consideration, after the basic legislation on the Central Intelligence Agency has been enacted. Admiral Hillenkoetter has been kind enough to invite us, as representatives of the Reserve Officers Association, to meet again with him and his associates after basic legislation shall have been enacted, to assist in drafting proposals for such enabling legislation.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD J. RIDDELL,  
Lieutenant Colonel, MI-Reserve.

## PROPOSED REDRAFT OF SECTION 202 OF S. 758

(a) There is hereby established a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate. Should a member of the United States Army, Navy, or Air Force be selected to become the Director of Central Intelligence, he shall serve as a civilian, but this appointment shall not deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law. The Director of Central Intelligence shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(b) The Central Intelligence Agency shall not be under the control of any department of the Federal Government or of any interdepartmental authority or council. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by a board composed of the heads of the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of other departmental intelligence agencies as needed, but he shall be responsible to the President alone.

(c) Subject to the authority and direction of the President, it shall be the duty of the Central Intelligence Agency:

(1) To coordinate the intelligence activities of all Federal Government agencies in the fields of collection, evaluation, and dissemination, in order not only to insure the maximum concentration of effort by each intelligence agency on subjects of primary concern to its department, but also to reduce to a minimum the duplication of effort between intelligence agencies and to prevent any omission in their intelligence coverage of essential subjects concerning foreign countries;

(2) To perform for ment such services which are not the pro-

(3) To conduct con-

(4) To prepare ove President, the Congre mental agencies, in or politico-military natu department, making f departmental intelligence

(5) To perform soci

(d) The existing in eral Government—suc the Air Force—shall bilities for the collec gence required for th Each of these existi: national intelligence r in the production of st ance with the provis this act that the exis to be the backbone, coordination of the C

(e) The Central in mation to the approp security, but shall ha counterintelligence fi

(f) Effective when office—

(1) The National and their functions s

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(3) The functions Intelligence Group s

vided that there be pending the full del in future enabling li

(Thereupon, at day, May 6, 1947.

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(2) To perform for the benefit of and in the interest of the Federal Government such services of common concern as can best be performed centrally or which are not the proper activity of any one intelligence agency;

(3) To conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States;

(4) To prepare over-all strategic intelligence estimates as required by the President, the Congress, the National Security Council, or other interdepartmental agencies, in order to provide the basis for national policy decisions of a politico-military nature which transcend the exclusive competence of any one department, making full use therein of estimates prepared by the appropriate departmental intelligence agencies;

(5) To perform such other duties as the President may direct.

(d) The existing intelligence agencies of the several departments of the Federal Government—such as the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force—shall continue to have their departmental intelligence responsibilities for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of the foreign intelligence required for the operating needs of their own and of other departments. Each of these existing departmental intelligence agencies shall also have certain national intelligence responsibilities for assisting the Central Intelligence Agency in the production of strategic and national policy intelligence estimates, in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (c) (4) above. It is the intent of this act that the existing departmental intelligence agencies shall thus continue to be the backbone of the national intelligence system, under the managerial coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(e) The Central Intelligence Agency shall advise and supply pertinent information to the appropriate agencies charged with the responsibility for domestic security, but shall have no police or law-enforcement functions and no domestic counterintelligence functions.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) The National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group and their functions shall cease to exist;

(2) The personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds of the National Intelligence Authority and of the Central Intelligence Group shall be transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency;

(3) The functions of the National Intelligence Authority and of the Central Intelligence Group shall be transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, provided that there be no conflict with the provisions of subparagraph (c) above, pending the full delineation of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency in future enabling legislation.

(Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene Tuesday, May 6, 1947.)

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some part of the bill which would safeguard the Marine Corps and the naval aviation.

Senator MAYBANK. Did you see the amendments that were suggested for the Marine Corps?

Admiral KING. I knew there were such amendments. I was not particularly taken with the phraseology.

Senator, may I say that I thought there were other people better qualified to pass on those things than I.

Since there has been general apprehension expressed in some quarters about the Marine Corps and naval aviation, I expressed the idea it would probably be well to safeguard those in the legislation more specifically. They are implicitly safeguarded now.

Senator MAYBANK. In keeping with what they have agreed on?

Admiral KING. Yes.

Senator MAYBANK. It has already been agreed to.

Admiral KING. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. I think the admiral has emphasized a very important point here; namely, that the Council should comprise all those agencies of the Government which have directly to do with the political, the military, the economic, and the industrial factors involved in the common defense; and that the Secretary of National Defense, as outlined in this bill, has only to do with the military part of it.

Admiral KING. That is right.

Senator BYRD. I do not think we should overlook that very fine point he has raised, which is the first time it has been raised in these hearings. If you look at this chart, the Secretary of National Defense has nothing to do with the National Security Council or the National Security Resources Board.

Admiral KING. I am, so to speak, Senator Byrd, throwing the spotlight on the National Security Council. It has mostly been focused on the question of the Secretary of National Defense and his powers, but the National Security Council is the key of the whole situation, in my view.

Senator BYRD. I think you have made a very important contribution to the thought along this line.

The CHAIRMAN. We were glad to have you with us this morning, Admiral. Thank you very much for the time you have put in on this question.

Admiral KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will hear now, and we are glad to have with us, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, who is known to all the land as president of the General Electric Co.

I understand you have put in some thought on this matter, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson, do you have a prepared statement?

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. WILSON, PRESIDENT, GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., NEW YORK, N. Y.**

Mr. Wilson. I appeared before the committee once before, Senator, and I had a prepared statement. I frankly did not know what other

contribution I could make. So, all I have prepared as I understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee of the committee last year this morning as and also go into it.

You may proceed, Mr. Wilson. new bill because old bill and the

In my previous principal object outlined, and at the top and concentration of authority; that and independence to inefficiency.

What we need I said I would serve as the ad should be, instead the services, with to the heads of

The proposed compromise is it is a splendid

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Then, certainly it would negate of various kinds as to submerge

Instead, even Secretary of National the identity of involved.

This consideration be put in operation collectively, and in the history

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contribution I might give you today other than the testimony I gave. So, all I have prepared myself with is a few notes on the present bill, as I understand it, and impressions concerning it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I might say, Mr. Wilson, that the make-up of the committee is entirely different as regards the members of the committee last year and this year. So, if you can refresh our memory this morning as to your best recollection of what you said last year and also go into details on this bill, we would be very much appreciative.

You may proceed in your own way.

Mr. Wilson. All right, sir. I will just give you my views on the new bill because I cover to some degree the impressions I had of the old bill and the comparison with this one.

In my previous testimony before the committee I stated that my principal objection to the proposed unification plan as it was then outlined, and as I had interpreted it was that it merely started at the top and combined the two Departments into one, with a concentration of administrative authority in the hard pattern of military authority; that the cost of the evaluation of the importance and stature and independent thinking of the separate Departments was an invitation to inefficiency, to authoritarianism, and to stultification.

What we need, I thought and still do, is less and not more rigidity.

I said I would question the good judgment of a man willing to serve as the administrator of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. He should be, instead, I believe, the coordinator of the three divisions of the services, with a maximum of authority and responsibility flowing to the heads of the individual services.

The proposed organizational plan under bill S. 758 is, as I see it, a compromise from the original proposed set-up; and all in all, I think it is a splendid scheme, for the following reasons:

First, that it establishes a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force with coequal status, as I understand it, to be administered by their respective Secretaries as individual units.

Thus, to a considerable degree, it seems to me the Secretary of National Defense will be substantially the over-all policy maker and, generally speaking, the coordinator.

I think this plan is practical and workable. It is my understanding of the motives of the framers of the bill that the identity of each of the three divisions, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, shall be preserved; that this can be accomplished in spite of the consolidation at the top.

Then, certainly the general unification plan should have plus values. It would negate the obvious material benefits and potential economies of various kinds if the merging of the three services was carried out so as to submerge the identity of each individual unit.

Instead, every consideration should be given, I believe, by the Secretary of National Defense as he coordinates the services to preserve the identity of each with due regard to the morale and cause spirit involved.

This consideration is due the services, for the unification plan will be put in operation just after each of the services individually, collectively, and cooperatively has successfully fought the greatest war in the history of the world.

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Magnificent spirit and morale and pride and faith in the corps that wins wars should not be lost through ineptness in establishing an organizational structure that disregards the human considerations and the general morale and the corps spirit, which attributes, incidentally, the organization we are eliminating or organizations we are eliminating have developed to a magnificent degree as evidenced by World War II experience.

I believe the establishment of the Munitions Board under the bill with duties and responsibilities as outlined is a splendid plan.

The same may be said for the proposed establishment of a research and development board.

This board would have the power to achieve great progress in the assigned fields of endeavors.

In addition to speeding up the research and development programs of each of the three Departments, you can ultimately effect, I believe, great economies of money and time through coordination of programs, elimination of overlapping programs, and other inefficiencies, through use of an integrated program to the extent the latter is feasible and desirable.

The foregoing recommendations are made from some small experience in the Government service during the war years, and from the experience or an intimate relationship with all of the three Departments: The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in my own business capacity.

On the other hand, I claim no background of long experience to ask you to consider my recommendations regarding the proposed establishment of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I have studied the organizational plan and purposes, and I think both agencies are highly desirable.

I might add that as a member of the President's Committee on Military Training, I have listened to military experts for months on subjects within the purview of the proposed operations and responsibilities of these two agencies.

The testimony I have heard leads me to most enthusiastically endorse the establishment of both agencies referred to as part of the new National Defense Establishment.

That is all I have to add, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

You testified before the Naval Affairs Committee last year on May 8. So I commend to the attention of the committee members your testimony at that time.

Mr. Wilson, you were very close to the Government during the war not only with the War Production Board but in other capacities. I see you are continuing your service with your membership now on the President's Advisory Committee on Training.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your belief as to the necessity of making permanent by legislation these agencies we have found are necessary during wartime, such as WPB, Strategic Materials, and things like that?

Mr. WILSON. I think it is very desirable, sir, that we continue to have a framework, a workable framework available in case of an

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## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

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We had made no effort to train any of our manpower. In 1940, it was still against the law to give any military training in the CCC—no Nazi goosestep for our boys. What was more important, we had made no move even to register, classify, and tabulate our manpower. In "militia"—as a preliminary measure. None of this foreign regeneration for us, who had forgotten a militia heritage going back 1,500 years to the Anglo-Saxon "hundreds." We frowned upon any measures to organize competent intelligence agencies; no dirty spy business for America. We starved such research and development agencies as we had—the merchants of death should not fatten on our taxes. We just buried our head in the neutrality laws and refused to face the facts.

Yes, we were a hot 60 percent in 1945, but we were a chilly 10 percent in 1939, when the shooting began, and I am afraid we had better not be caught cold like that the next time. Any questions?

(Note.—Charts and references to charts have been omitted in the foregoing extracts.)

Senator ROBERTSON. The other two lectures in the pamphlet are devoted to the Army's attitude toward universal conscription—a matter not directly germane to the present issue, but an essential element in obtaining positive military control over the manpower of the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point I would like to interrupt the hearings to have inserted in the record a memorandum respecting section 202—central intelligence agency of the bill—submitted by Charles S. Cheston, 1421 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., formerly deputy director, Army Specialist Corps, and also Assistant Director of the Office of Strategic Services. The memorandum is as follows:

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, before giving you my specific suggestions in regard to section 202 of the proposed bill (H. R. 2319) providing for the creation of a central intelligence agency, I should like to express very briefly the point of view on which these suggestions are founded.

My basic concept is this: That from the standpoint of national security modern science and methods have annihilated one of the major bases of our defense; that is, the defense of space. It is now primarily a question of defense in point of time. By this I mean that any nation which is capable of striking a surprise blow with adequate resources and modern weapons (such as atomic warfare, chemical warfare, and bacteriological warfare, backed by air power with sufficient striking force), will have an excellent chance of winning with the first blow, perhaps in a matter of days. If this is not true of any nation today, it is certainly a likelihood to be reckoned with in the near future.

The all-importance of the time factor makes intelligence the key to defense. Hence, it follows that intelligence is far more vital today than it ever was in the past. Just as there is a need for new and fresh thinking about modern warfare, so there is a parallel need for new and fresh thinking about the increased importance of intelligence.

For this reason, on the question of national security alone, I view a coordinated effective central intelligence service as one of the major arms of our national defense establishment of equal importance to national security with the Air Force, the Army, or the Navy. If it is to be fully effective, it must therefore be given the status, authority, funds, and personnel with which to do its job adequately. In my opinion a so-called central intelligence service can no more do its job, if it continues to be related to a subordinate position in a department of some other branch or branches of government, than the Air Force could have done its job in World War II as a subordinate unit of one or more of the armed services.

It is my belief that from the standpoint of a national intelligence service we are unprepared today. I earnestly urge that in this section of the bill, as well as all its other provisions, full recognition be given to the fact that our problem is to create an organization equipped to deal, not with the problems of the last war, or of today alone, but with the future as well.

In my opinion there are three basic prerequisites for a central intelligence service.

First, there should be a civilian director, who must of course have the necessary qualifications and background.

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## NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

There are three reasons why I am convinced that it is essential to have a civilian director.

The first reason is that political, economic, technological, and other intelligence with which the agency would be concerned are highly specialized fields. They require specially trained personnel—people who have devoted years to studying the intricate and subtle nature of international relations, people who have spent years in learning to know and understand foreign countries. It is certainly not slighting of our national service academics to say that they do not prepare officers for the special requirements of political and economic intelligence. Our two academies, faced with the task of training officers in the many specialties of modern technical warfare, cannot be expected to provide the broad and extensive education required for the complex field of political and economic intelligence. It follows, therefore, that we must turn to the civilian world to find the man who by years of study and experience is qualified for the specialized requirements of directing political, economic, and technological intelligence operations.

Secondly, the appointment of a civilian director gives greater assurance of continuity of leadership. I do not have to point out to you gentlemen the vital importance of continuity in intelligence operations. Intelligence specialists are not made overnight. It takes years of training and experience to develop professional intelligence personnel. If a military man were appointed director of CIA, the inclination would be to alternate the office among Army, Navy, and Air Corps. The essential continuity of leadership would be lost. We have already seen an example of this. The Central Intelligence Authority in a period of 14 months has had as director one Army general, a Navy admiral, and I understand is about to change again with the appointment of another Navy officer. A military man as director would be likely to regard his appointment as little more than another tour of duty, another assignment to be discharged as part of his own military career. He would be unable to view his appointment as having a certain permanence so long as he is subject to Army or Navy orders.

No organization can progress under a series of temporary directors. The dangers resulting from a constantly changing leadership can be removed only by the appointment of a man who will—and can—regard the office of director as a career in itself. Permanency of leadership will have a favorable effect upon the entire staff of the intelligence agency, for it will help to develop the esprit de corps which is vital to the efficient functioning of any professional group. It will help to attract men and women who are willing to make intelligence work their lifetime career.

Thirdly, the appointment of a civilian director will free the CIA from the rigidities of the military system. The reasons why this country historically has placed its armed forces under civilian members of the Cabinet apply with force to the director of central intelligence. A professional officer, who has spent his life in the military or naval service, can hardly be expected to ignore the principles of seniority, chain of command, and similar elements which are so vital to the efficient functioning of any military organization but which are totally unsuited to the work of a national central intelligence service.

The second basic prerequisite for a central intelligence agency is that it should have its own funds appropriated by Congress.

The nature of CIA's work requires that it be independent of any department of government; since it is obliged to serve all, it must be free of the natural bias and special viewpoint of any one operating department. This means that it must have its own budget and its own personnel. If such agency is to be completely dependent upon the Army, Navy, Air Corps, and State Department for its funds, it will lose much of its independence of operation, which is so vital to its success. No director of a central intelligence agency could in these circumstances adequately plan or efficiently execute even the least of the duties and responsibilities which conceivably would be entrusted to such an agency, nor would he be in a position to attract and hold the type of men who are required for this work. A national intelligence service must be a career service. The men who serve in it must undergo years of training and preparation, and they must be able to look forward to making their career in a service that has the authority, status, and permanence necessary to do its job. The central intelligence group as now constituted offers no such incentive; on the contrary its uncertain status acts as a deterrent to men of the very type it should attract.

Third and last, the director of the central intelligence agency should be responsible to a Secretary of National Defense having the duties and responsibilities outlined in this bill.

It has been times required of Government of policy, its own operations, house for its members. We defined our sources and of information Government upon which intelligence to improve national and and operational whose prime offices.

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It has been amply demonstrated that problems of peace and war in modern times require total intelligence. Each of the principal departments and agencies of Government requires information for the determination of basic questions of policy, the collection and analysis of which are entirely outside the scope of its own operations. It does not solve the problem to create a kind of clearing house for information gathered in the ordinary operations of the several departments. What is needed is an effective, integrated, single agency with clearly defined duties and authority to analyze and correlate information from all sources and, wherever necessary, to supplement existing methods of collection of information. Such an agency must serve all principal departments of the Government and also bring together the full and comprehensive information upon which national policy must be based. It should not supplant existing intelligence units within the several departments. Every effort should be made to improve and strengthen these units wherever possible. The problem is national and not departmental. And it will not be solved by having the policies and operation of such an agency determined by a committee of Cabinet members, whose primary duty is to discharge the full-time responsibilities of their own offices.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue Senator Robertson.

Senator ROBERTSON. It is important that we should understand what the Army Information School is. It was established on January 23, 1946, as a special installation at Carlisle Barracks under the supervisory control of the Director of Information.

The instructions contained in the circular are effective until July 29, 1947, unless sooner rescinded or superseded. The objective of the Army Information School is to train competent personnel for public relations and information and education staff sections.

The curriculum and doctrine of the school are under the supervision of the Director of Information. Although the quotas of students were to be announced by the War Department, Circular No. 28 prescribed staff officers' courses which were to begin on February 27, 1946, to run concurrently for 100 information and education personnel and 100 public-relations personnel; and set the length of courses as 8 weeks each.

Enlisted courses were prescribed to begin about October 1, 1946, to run concurrently for 150 information and education personnel and 150 public-relations personnel. The length of the enlisted courses was set at 4 weeks. From time to time the Director of Information was to arrange appropriate courses for groups such as commanders, senior staff officers, and instructors in service schools.

Assuming that the implied quotas of 200 officers per staff officer's course and of 300 enlisted men per enlisted course have been maintained, 1,400 officers and 2,100 enlisted men—to say nothing of the numbers of commanders, senior staff officers, and instructors in service schools who have attended the special courses—have been indoctrinated with the militaristic tenets contained in these lectures of General Palmer, and have been assigned the duty of spreading the gospel to an unsuspecting public and to the more than a million men in active service, every one of whom is a prospective disciple once he returns to civilian life.

It was this fact to which General Edson alluded when he said in his testimony that he did not overlook the powers of propaganda, even in such a democracy as ours. Nor, I would add, can we overlook the power which rest in the expenditure of \$11,000,000,000 a year—over a third of our annual appropriations—under control of the military coalition which this bill would establish.

Finally, in fairness to General Edson, I wish to point out that he stated emphatically that he is not opposed to unification; and that he

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JANUARY 16, 1947.

The President,

The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 31, 1946, we jointly submitted to you a letter which gave our respective views on the major elements involved in establishing a greater measure of unification of our armed forces.

In your letter of June 15, 1946, you expressed gratification at the progress made in narrowing the zone of disagreement which had previously existed between the services and stated your position with reference to the essential points on which disagreement still existed.

In our opinion, the necessity for agreement between the military services is now even greater than at the time of our earlier letter. We and our representatives have been meeting in an effort to secure further resolution, within the scope and the spirit of the statement of your position, of the views of the two Departments. We are pleased to report success in this undertaking.

We agree to support legislation in which the following points are incorporated:

(a) There shall be a Council of National Defense, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central Intelligence Agency (which already exists) as agreed by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in their letter to the President of May 31, 1946.

(b) The armed forces shall be organized under a Secretary of National Defense so as to place the Army, the Navy (to include the Marine Corps and naval aviation), and the Air Force, each with a military chief, under the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, respectively. Each shall be under a Secretary and, under the over-all direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered as an individual unit. The Secretary of any of the three Departments may, at any time, present to the President, after first informing the Secretary of National Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary or desirable.

(c) A War Council shall be created consisting of the Secretary of National Defense as chairman and with power of decision, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and the military heads of the three services. The War Council will concern itself with matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.

(d) There shall be a Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the military heads of the three services, and also the Chief of Staff to the President if that office exists. Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide for the strategic direction of the military forces of the United States, will formulate strategic plans, assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, integrate the military requirements, and as directed, advise in the integration of the military budget.

(e) There shall be a full-time Joint Staff to consist initially of not over 100 officers to be provided in approximately equal numbers by the three services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof, shall carry out policies and directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(f) The Secretary of National Defense shall head the Armed Forces Establishment, shall be vested with authority, under the President, to establish common policies and common programs for the integrated operation of the three Departments, and shall exercise control over and direct their common efforts to discharge their responsibility for national security.

We are agreed that the proper method of setting forth the functions (so-called roles and missions) of the armed forces is by the issuance of an Executive order concurrently with your approval of the appropriate legislation. We attach for your consideration a mutually agreed draft of such an order.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,  
Secretary of War.  
JAMES FORRESTAL,  
Secretary of the Navy.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.



views expressed in this letter would not, in our opinion, be in the best interests of the United States."

On June 15 President Truman sent identical letters to Senators Thomas and Walsh, and Representatives May and Vinson transmitting documents showing points upon which the War and Navy Departments had agreed and disagreed, and submitting his own recommendations on the items of disagreement. S. 2044 was revised, but opposition continuing, the President requested that the measure be dropped.

**9. Unified command announcement of December 16, 1946**

The War and Navy Departments announced on this date that unified command had been established in seven command areas in various parts of the world. The commander in each area was to be responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The principle of unified command in theaters of operation was established after Pearl Harbor, and was generally applied during the war. It was not used in the Pacific area for the assault on Japan. With the end of the war the idea of unity of command in the field had gradually disintegrated.)

**10. Presidential announcement of Army-Navy agreement, January 16, 1946**

Letters to the President from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson stated that agreement had been reached to support legislation providing for a Secretary of National Defense with general over-all direction over three departments—War, Navy, and Air—and for other coordinating agencies. There was also agreement on a draft of an Executive order assigning functions to the three branches of the armed forces. The President stated that in his opinion the agreement reached was "an admirable compromise," and "a thoroughly practical and workable plan of unification," and that he heartily approved it.

**11. Transmittal of proposed bill by the President, February 26, 1947**

In a communication directed to the Speaker of the House and Senator Vandenberg the President stated that the proposed bill had been drafted by representatives of the armed services and had the approval of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added:

"It is my belief that this suggested legislation accomplishes the desired unification of the services, and I heartily recommend its enactment."

**PART II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROPOSALS**

Beginning with the War Department plan submitted to the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy (Woodrum committee) in the spring of 1944, there has been a succession of proposals for the reorganization of the armed forces. Particularly significant in the development of the controversy were the proposal of the special committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 11, 1945; the Eberstadt plan; the plans presented by the War Department at the hearings of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; the President's proposals of December 19, 1945; the Thomas-Hill-Austin bill (S. 2044); the President's plan of June 15, 1946; and the draft of a proposed bill submitted to the Congress by the President February 26, 1947. There follows a summary of each of these proposals.

**1. 1944 War Department proposal\***

This proposal had three general features:

(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces headed by a Secretary who would be the principal adviser to the President and the Congress on political and administrative matters relating to national defense. There would be Under Secretaries for the Army, Navy, and Air, and also a Director of Common Supply Services.

(b) There would be a United States Joint Chiefs of Staff headed by a Chief of Staff and including the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. The Director of Common Supply Services would be included on a subordinate status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the President's military advisers and would report directly to him in the field of military strategy and on budgetary recommendations and the allocation of appropriated funds.

\* See testimony of Lieutenant General McNarney, hearings before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d sess., pt. I, pp. 24-27, chart p. 28.



(c) It was recommended that the legislation establishing a single department be general in character. The Secretary for the Armed Forces would have over-all control of such matters as procurement, supply of common items, storage, construction, provision of facilities, welfare, financial administration, hospitalization, personnel standards and administration, recruiting, military education in civilian institutions, and public relations. The manner of administering the department and the extent of decentralization would be left to develop in an evolutionary manner.

## 2. Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense\*

The recommendations of the majority of the special committee go into considerable detail. The essential features of the plan recommended are as follows:

(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces headed by a civilian Secretary, who would be the principal adviser to the President on the political, economic, and industrial aspects of military problems, be responsible for the administration of the Department, and act as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Directly responsible to him would be a Commander of the Armed Forces, an Under Secretary for business matters, and several Assistant Secretaries for staff functions.

(b) There would be an Under Secretary for business matters, occupying roughly the same position for such matters as the Commander of the Armed Forces has for military matters. He would have such Assistant Secretaries as might be required for the various duties that would have to be performed.

(c) There would be one military Commander of the Armed Forces who would also be Chief of Staff to the President and a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He would have responsibility for the decision of all questions involving command and military control of the armed forces. He would have a staff which would be concerned with matters involving more than one component. There would also be Deputy Chiefs of Staff for personnel, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics.

(d) There would be three coordinate components—Army, Navy, and Air Force—each headed by a single commander, and each having a considerable measure of autonomy in operation.

(e) There would be a United States Chiefs of Staff to advise the President on broad matters of military strategy and on budgetary matters. The members would be the Secretary, the Commander of the Armed Forces, and the Commanders of the three components.

## 3. Eberstadt report recommendation\*

(a) Three coordinate departments—War, Air, and Navy—were recommended. Each would have a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary, and such assistant secretaries as might be needed, commanded by a military officer. Naval and Army air arms would be retained.

(b) A National Security Council would be established to link up military and foreign policy. It would be composed of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Air, the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the joint chiefs of staff. The President would be the chairman, and in his absence the Vice President or the Secretary of State. The council would have a permanent secretariat. It would have policy-forming and advisory functions and would, among other things, advise on the combined military budget. The Central Intelligence Agency would be a part of it.

(c) The joint chiefs of staff would be given a statutory basis and would advise on strategy, logistic plans, and budgetary matters. In these areas the joint chiefs of staff would constitute the major coordinating mechanism for the three departments.

(d) A National Security Resources Board would be set up to work out industrial and civilian mobilization plans. It would be composed of representatives of the War, Navy, and Air Departments, the chairman of the Military Munitions Board, and representatives of such other temporary or regular agencies as might be involved. The chairman would be an appointee of the President with full power of decision.

\* Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 411 ff., chart opposite 412.

\* See report to Hon. James Forrestal on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, Senate committee print, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 6 ff., also chart opposite p. 6.

(e) A Military Munitions Board to coordinate procurement and logistic of the three departments, have full power of decision on procurement and logistic.

(f) Each department would have a civilian under secretary and development, a civilian and military research.

(g) A Military Education Board to coordinate military education in civilian institutions, and public relations.

(h) A Central Intelligence Security Council.

## 4. War Department (Col)

The War Department hearings in 1945 was a committee of the joint chiefs of staff.

(a) There would be a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary to coordinate plans, and legislative affairs.

(b) A Chief of Staff of personnel matters, international of the military arm.

(c) Under the Chief of Staff, three components, each headed by a military officer (the case of the Navy). Each component would retain autonomy and would retain direct contact with the President.

(d) There would be a Chief of Staff of the Army.

(e) The United States Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, would constitute the President through the Chiefs of Staff.

(f) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force would not be taken into account as well as those of the Navy in order to insure rotation.

## 5. President Truman's staff

(a) There would be a civilian secretary. A civilian under secretary, would be available for the President. The Secretary might determine the details.

(b) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of the War.

(c) The President would establish central coordinating committees. The details should not be taken into account.

(d) There would be a civilian secretary for each of the three components.

(e) The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

\* See hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 156 ff., also chart opposite 157.

(e) A Military Munitions Board, with functions broader than those of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, would act as a coordinating agency in the field of procurement and logistics. Its members would be the civilian under secretaries of the three departments. A civilian chairman appointed by the President would have full power of decision. The committee would supervise all joint committees on procurement and logistics matters.

(f) Each department would have an assistant secretary for scientific research and development. A civilian research agency was recommended to link civilian and military research.

(g) A Military Education and Training Board, under the supervision of the joint Chiefs of Staff, would coordinate military education and training. It would be composed of representatives of the three departments, and would have an advisory board on military education and training.

(h) A Central Intelligence Agency would be established in the National Security Council.

#### 4. War Department (Collins) plan\*

The War Department plan proposed at the Senate Military Affairs Committee hearings in 1945 was a modification of the plan recommended by the special committee of the joint chiefs of staff.

(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces, with a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary, and three or more civilian assistant secretaries to coordinate scientific research, procurement and industrial mobilization plans, and legislative affairs and information.

(b) A Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, assisted by a small staff for military personnel matters, intelligence, joint training, and logistics, would be in command of the military aspect of the department, under the secretary.

(c) Under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces would be the three major components, each headed by a chief of staff (Chief of Naval Operations in the case of the Navy). Each component would have a considerable measure of autonomy and would retain its own service system. The secretary would be able to consult directly with the three chiefs of staff. The theater commanders would also be under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

(d) There would be a Director of Common Supply and Hospitalization, also under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

(e) The United States Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff to the President, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Chiefs of Staff of the three components, would have powers of recommendation on military policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements. Their recommendations would go to the President through the Secretary, with his comments. Any dissenting member could report to the President through the Secretary.

(f) The Chief of Staff to the President and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces would not be taken from the same component at any given time. Their terms as well as those of the Chiefs of Staff of the components would be limited in order to insure rotation of office.

#### 5. President Truman's first plan\*

(a) There would be a single Department of National Defense, with a civilian Secretary. A civilian Under Secretary, and several civilian Assistant Secretaries, would be available for assignment to whatever duties the President and the Secretary might determine from time to time.

(b) The Department would have three coordinate branches, each under an Assistant Secretary. The Navy would retain its own carrier-ship and water-based aviation, and the Marine Corps.

(c) The President and the Secretary would be given ample authority to establish central coordinating and service organizations, military and civilian. The details should not be specified in legislation, but should be left to executive decision.

(d) There would be a Chief of Staff of National Defense and a commander for each of the three components.

(e) The Chief of Staff and the three commanders would constitute an advisory body to the President and the Secretary. The position of Chief of Staff would

\* See hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 168 ff., also chart opposite p. 159.  
\* Message to Congress from the President, December 19, 1945, daily Congressional Record, pp. 12573-12577.

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rotate among the three components. The President and the Secretary would communicate directly with the three commanders.

(f) It was recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee be continued, and that following reorganization of the armed forces military research be coordinated under one agency, and a Government-wide intelligence service be established.

#### 6. The Thomas-Hill-Austin bill (S. 2044, 79th Cong., 2nd sess.)<sup>1</sup>

(a) There would be a single Department of Common Defense, headed by a civilian Secretary. The War and Navy Departments would be abolished. The Department of Common Defense would have a civilian Under Secretary and a civilian Secretary, without Cabinet status, for each of the three components—Army, Navy, and Air Force.

(b) Four Assistant Secretaries, under the Secretary, would supervise and coordinate scientific research and development; intelligence activities; procurement, logistics, industrial mobilization, and hospitalization; and educational and training activities.

(c) A Chief of Staff of Common Defense would act as the Secretary's chief military adviser, and would also act as chief military adviser of the President. The appointment would be rotated. The Chief of Staff would have a small staff.

(d) A Chief of Staff of Common Defense and the commanding officers of the three components would constitute a Joint Staff of the Department. The Joint Staff would make recommendations to the President through the Secretary on military policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements. The Secretary could attach his comment on these recommendations. Any one of the three commanding officers could report to the President after consideration by the Joint Staff, through the Secretary, who could add his comment to those of the Joint Staff.

(e) The President would be authorized to reorganize the Department and its military components under the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1945, with the proviso that no component could be abolished.

(f) A Council of Common Defense would be set up as an independent agency, to coordinate foreign and military policy. It would be headed by the Secretary of State and would include the Secretary of Common Defense and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. It would have a permanent secretariat with an executive secretary.

(g) There would also be a National Security Resources Board for industrial and civilian mobilization planning. This Board would be under the authority of the Council of Common Defense.

(h) A Central Intelligence Agency, operating as an agency of the Council of Common Defense, would compile, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate information gathered by civilian and military agencies.

#### 7. President Truman's second plan<sup>2</sup>

This plan contained 12 points. Eight represented agreement between the War and Navy Departments. On 4 there was disagreement. (a, b, c, and d below.)

(a) There would be a single Department of National Defense with a civilian Secretary. Each of the three services would have a civilian Secretary, who would not have a seat in the Cabinet. The civilian Secretaries would be members of the Council of Common Defense. (The Navy Department opposed a single Department.)

(b) The three services—Army, Navy, and Air Forces—would have parity. (The Navy Department preferred to preserve the two-department arrangements.)

(c) The Navy would retain some naval aviation, but not as much as it wanted.

(d) The Marine Corps would remain in the Navy with its mission intact. (The War Department position would have reduced its mission.)

On the remaining eight points there was agreement.

(e) A Council of National Defense, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, the civilian Secretaries of the three military services, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, would integrate foreign and military policies.

<sup>1</sup> As reported out by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, May 13, 1946. See S. Rept. No. 1323, 79th Cong., 2d sess., which accompanied S. 2044. Substantial amendments were proposed following the President's recommendations of June 15. See committee print of June 26, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> See letter from President Truman to Senators Thomas and Walsh, and Representatives May and Vinson, June 15, 1946.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

(f) A National Security Resources Board, under the Council of National Defense, would establish and keep up to date policies and programs for the use of the Nation's resources in support of our national security. It would be composed of representatives of the military services and other appropriate agencies.

(g) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would formulate strategic plans, assign logistic responsibilities to the Services, integrate military programs, and make recommendations on budgetary matters. It would be the highest source of military advice.

(h) There would be no single military Chief of Staff. (The War Department agreed to drop this feature.)

(i) A Central Intelligence Agency, under the Council of National Defense, would compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered by military and civilian agencies.

(j, k, l) Agencies would be established to coordinate military supply and procurement, scientific research and development in the military services, and military education and training.

8. Draft of proposed bill submitted by the President, February 26, 1947

(a) A National Defense Establishment would be created headed by a civilian Secretary of National Defense. The Establishment would consist of the Departments of the Navy, Army, (instead of War) and Air Force, together with all other agencies created within the establishment. The Secretary of National Defense would establish policies and programs for the establishment and for the departments and agencies therein; exercise authority and control over such agencies; and formulate and finally determine the budget estimates and control the budget program.

(b) The Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, would be administered as individual units by their respective Secretaries. The Secretary of any one of the three Departments would be permitted to present to the President any report or recommendation relating to his Department, after so informing the Secretary of National Defense.

(c) The Secretary of National Defense would be authorized to appoint not more than four special civilian assistants, and such other civilian personnel as might be required to perform the functions of the National Defense Establishment. He would be specifically prohibited from establishing a military staff, but officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force could be detailed to him as assistants and personal aids.

(d) A Department of the Air Force would be created, containing the United States Air Force. Transferred to the United States Air Force would be the Army Air Forces; the Air Corps, United States Army; and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command).

(e) A War Council would be set up within the National Defense Establishment. It would be composed of the four Secretaries, and the Chiefs of Staff of the three Departments (Chief of Naval Operations in the case of the Navy). The Secretary of National Defense would have power of decision. The Council would advise the Secretary of National Defense on matters of broad policy.

(f) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Departments and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if any, would be established within the Defense Establishment. Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prepare strategic plans and provide strategic direction; prepare logistic plans; establish unified area commands when needed; formulate policies for joint training; review material and personnel requirements of the military forces; provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and act as military advisers to the President and the Secretary of National Defense. Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be a Joint Staff of not more than 100 officers, composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

(g) A Munitions Board, composed of a civilian Chairman appointed by the Secretary of National Defense and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, would provide coordination within the Establishment with regard to various aspects of procurement, production, distribution, and other industrial and service functions.

(h) A Research and Development Board would be set up in the Defense Establishment to coordinate research activities within the Establishment and advise the Secretary of National Defense on matters of research.

(i) Outside the National Defense Establishment would be established a National Security Council, and under it a Central Intelligence Agency. There would be also established a National Security Resources Board. These agencies would coordinate military and civilian policies, programs, and plans in their respective fields. (See the Eberstadt recommendations and later proposals.)

(A copy of bill S. 758 is as follows:)

[S. 758, 80th Cong., 1st sess.]

A BILL To promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment, which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

#### SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947"

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##### TITLE I—THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

###### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

- Sec. 101. (a) There is hereby established the National Defense Establishment, and a Secretary of National Defense, who shall be the head thereof.
- (b) The National Defense Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

together with all other agencies ment.

SECRET:

Sec. 102. (a) The Secretary civilian life by the President, b Under the direction of the Pr for the National Defense Estal therein; he shall exercise direct and agencies; he shall supervise mater by the departments and which shall be submitted to rect; he shall formulate and for Defense Establishment for sub- supervise and control the budg- under the applicable appropria Army, the Department of the the direction of the Secretary individual units by their respect- ing herein contained shall pre- presenting to the President, at Defense, any report or recomme- deem necessary.

(b) The Secretary of Nation the President and the Congre- ments of the National Defense E as he shall deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of Nation for the National Defense Esta approve, and judicial notice sh

MILITARY

Sec. 103. Officers of the Army assistants and personal aides t no; establish a military staff.

Sec. 104. (a) The Secretary civilian life not to exceed four performance of his duties. Ea- at the rate of \$12,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of Nati- service laws and the Classific- the compensation of such oth- performance of the functions c

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Sec. 105. (a) The Departm- partment of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army. Chau- activities of the Department- determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regul- ment of War or to any officer shall, insofar as they are no deemed to relate to the Dept- Establishment or to such offic-

(c) The term "Department- to mean the Department of th- quarters, forces, Reserve co- under the control or supervis-



and military chiefs of the three Departments as members. That War Council is similar to the War Council in the War Department now provided by the National Defense Act of 1920, which consists of a Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff.

Second, there is to be the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the duties of preparing strategic plans, preparing joint logistic plans, establishing unified commands in strategic areas, making plans for joint training, and reviewing material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans. That is this box here on the chart. Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff there is to be a Joint Staff, not to exceed 100 officers, drawn in equal numbers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

That is, of course, like the present Joint Chiefs of Staff, created by Executive order and not by law. It will be an improvement, because the duties will be defined; and at the present time, the line between the powers of the Secretaries, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a very hard line indeed to draw.

I have also been of the view that matters that did not pertain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff got before them and other matters that should have come before them did not come before them, because the matter now rests largely upon custom and practice. Under this act there is written definition of the functions.

Third, there is a third joint agency, the Munitions Board, with a chairman from civilian life appointed by the Secretary of National Defense, with the duty of planning for industrial mobilization, of recommending assignment of procurement responsibilities with the aim of single procurement authority to cover technical equipment and common-use items, and of determining priorities between military procurement programs. This agency is to replace the present Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board. The functions of this Munitions Board under the bill do not differ in substance from the powers of the present Munitions Board.

Fourth, there is the Research and Development Board set up in the National Defense Establishment, to prepare an integrated program of research and development for military purposes and to formulate policy on matters involving outside agencies in the research and development field. This agency will replace the present Joint Research and Development Board of the War Department and Navy Department. That Board is a board that is set up by joint agreement of the two Secretaries, and it began to function about a year ago. Dr. Vannevar Bush is the Chairman of it.

In addition to the National Defense Establishment, the bill creates a National Security Council. Referring to the chart, if I may, that is up in the top box there at the left, right under the President. That National Security Council is made up of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and such other members as the President may appoint. The function of the Council shall be to advise the President on integration of foreign and military policies and to enable the military services and other agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters relative to

national defense. That council takes the place of the present so-called Committee of Three, which exists just by joint agreement of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy at the present time. It has been operative for some time. It also takes the place of what they call the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, composed of the Assistant Secretaries, which meets with regularity on stated days and has a small staff.

Under the Council is the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by a director appointed by the President. This is to take the place of the existing Central Intelligence Group, which was created by Executive order of the President about a year ago, under an agency called the National Intelligence Authority, made up of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief.

The bill also provides for a National Security Resources Board, which is in the upper right-hand box there, with a chairman and the heads of executive departments or agencies designated by the President. The function of the Board is to advise the President on policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization, on programs for effective use in time of war of natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, on policies for creating reserves of critical materials, and similar matters. I might say that that Board is for planning purposes only, advisory to the President, and it is on the planning level like the War Production Board of the last war.

Of course, it is restricted only to planning and policies and not to actual operations, in time of peace.

From this brief outline of the bill, it will be seen that the heart of it is the creation of a single establishment, the National Defense Establishment, to be made up of the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force and to be directed by a Secretary of National Defense, with broad power to establish policies and programs for all agencies in the Establishment, to exercise direction, authority and control over them, and to set up the budget estimates of the Establishment on a unified basis. The Secretary, as I see it, is to be an executive but not an administrator.

I have in mind a distinction between those two terms. It may not be in everyone's mind the same way, but as I see it, the Secretary of National Defense is to be responsible for over-all programs and for comprehensive over-all planning but is not to attend to details or matters of administration.

It is also important to note that the bill, in addition to establishing the Defense Establishment, makes provision for two other agencies. Those are the two up at the top. They are the National Security Council, and under it the Central Intelligence Agency, which is to integrate foreign policy and military policy and which is to succeed a less formal organization of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy already in existence; and the National Security Resources Board, an advisory group to study problems of industrial and civilian mobilization.

I will next trace the developments that led to the preparation of this measure. In general, they are in four stages. The first is this: As the war wore on, the impression became widespread that our national defense structure stood in need of reorganization. In April and May 1944 a special committee of the House of Representatives,

the Committee on Postwar Motion of a unified organization representatives, including Secretary of War, and Air Forces.

Second, following this, the to find out the views of the plan of organization. The large majority of those in need of a unified organization system. The board made its 1945, to the effect that the single department, with three

Third, in the latter part of the committee held hearings on the introduced in April 1946 by creation of a single department the committee. The Seventy consideration of the bill on the floor

Fourth, the President, by 1945, urged passage of legislation armed forces. In May 1946 Navy to report to him as to sent a joint letter to the President points agreed and points not of June 15, 1946, to the Secretary on the points as to which the two Secretaries.

The Secretaries of War and an effort to arrive at a full Under date of January 16, outlining a complete agreement Establishment. The bill has the approval of the War

As I see it, we have two armed forces be advantageous present bill furnish a unified workable? I am convinced

The need for a unified field. It involves the employment and air—as members of a team bility for direction and management, concentrated, not divided as zation, as I see it, is a plain

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of Representatives,

the Committee on Postwar Military Policy, held hearings on the ques-  
tion of a unified organization of the armed forces. War Department  
representatives, including Secretary Stimson, testified in support of  
a single department of the armed forces, with branches of Army,  
Navy, and Air Forces.

Second, following this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a board  
to find out the views of the overseas commanders and to report on a  
plan of organization. The board traveled overseas and found that a  
large majority of those in posts of command were convinced of the  
need of a unified organization, in place of the existing two-department  
system. The board made its report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in  
1945, to the effect that the military services should be united under a  
single department, with three branches, Army, Navy, and Air.

Third, in the latter part of 1945 the Senate Military Affairs Com-  
mittee held hearings on the matter. As a result, a bill, S. 2044, was  
introduced in April 1946 by Senator Thomas of Utah, providing for  
creation of a single department. The bill was reported favorably by  
the committee. The Seventy-ninth Congress adjourned without con-  
sideration of the bill on the floor of the Senate.

Fourth, the President, by a message to Congress on December 19,  
1945, urged passage of legislation to create a single department of the  
armed forces. In May 1946 he directed the Secretaries of War and  
Navy to report to him as to the points agreed on. The Secretaries  
sent a joint letter to the President under date of May 31, 1946, listing  
points agreed and points not agreed. The President then sent a letter  
of June 15, 1946, to the Secretaries of War and Navy, giving his views  
on the points as to which there was lack of agreement between the  
two Secretaries.

The Secretaries of War and Navy continued their negotiations in  
an effort to arrive at a full agreement. This effort was successful.  
Under date of January 16, 1947, they sent a letter to the President,  
outlining a complete agreement on organization of a National Defense  
Establishment. The bill before you is the product of that agreement.  
It has the approval of the War Department and the Navy Department.

As I see it, we have two issues: First, will a unified structure of the  
armed forces be advantageous to our national defense; second, does the  
present bill furnish a unified structure that is sound, efficient, and  
workable? I am convinced that the answer is "yes" to both questions.

The need for a unified organization of the armed forces may be  
stated in a few sentences. The field of national defense is a single  
field. It involves the employment of the military forces—ground, sea,  
and air—as members of a team. This being the case, the top responsi-  
bility for direction and management of the military forces should be  
concentrated, not divided as at present. The case for a unified organi-  
zation, as I see it, is as plain as that.

In earlier times the operations of the Army and Navy were so  
separate in character that they could be conducted readily enough on  
independent lines. The boundaries were capable of easy definition.  
Field activities that required closely integrated movements by the  
Army and the Navy were the exception rather than the rule.

Two factors, far-reaching and profound in their importance, have  
changed the situation and made old forms of organization obsolete.

As to the effect of scientific and mechanical advances, the first factor is the swift advance in mechanization and technology. The speed and range of sea forces and ground forces are many times what they were a generation ago. A third force, air power, has come into the picture, with the swiftest speed and longest range of all, and with capabilities that even now are not comprehended. The simple truth is that air power does not fit into the old frame of Army and Navy. The value of air power to our national security requires that it be placed in a position of parity with land power and sea power.

Science and invention have come up with other new weapons and equipment that have obliterated coastlines and made meaningless the former boundaries between sea operations and land operations. The Dukw is an example—a heavy truck that takes a cargo from ship's side in deep water, swims to the coast, travels overland, and drops the cargo at the point of destination many miles inland. And the Dukw is not the final word in amphibious vehicles. You will notice the spelling, D-u-k-w. Of course, that is like these inventories that you see in the Army, of pants, twill, and so on.

I understand that the D-u-k-w comes from this: "D" stands for 1942; "u" for utility; "k" for front-wheel drive; and I forget what "w" stands for.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there someone in the audience who will please enlighten the Secretary?

Secretary PATTERSON. It has been suggested that it means "water-borne," but I doubt it. That is too obvious.

The second new factor is the stupendous demand that warfare in this day and age makes on our resources in manpower and materials. In the last war, it was brought home to us that there are limits to our resources. Ground forces, sea forces, and air forces make heavy and competing demands on the Nation's resources. It is of peremptory importance that the size and the priority of those demands be regulated. They cannot be regulated effectively unless a single authority has the responsibility for development of a comprehensive plan of national defense.

The fact that national defense is a single enterprise, with emphasis on the interrelation of the three forces—ground, sea, and air—was amply borne out in the last 5 years. In the campaigns of World War II the most notable characteristic was the teamwork of sea, land, and air forces. Time after time the Navy and Air Forces would clear the way, so that the Army could make the landings and fight its way forward. No one service won the war. The combined effort of all three together was decisive. In operations of that type, the need for interlocking activities was so plain that the task had to be viewed as a single job, with a single commander held responsible for results.

It became the rule to have unity of command in the field. The commander, no matter whether he came from the Army, Navy, or Air, had under his control Army forces, Navy forces, and Air forces. The old idea of voluntary cooperation in military operations received its deathblow at Pearl Harbor.

In the advantages to be drawn from unified control, no sensible distinction can be drawn between the single campaign in a given region and the sum total of activities of the armed forces. Both involve planning; both involve operations; both involve the supply functions

that are called logistics. of control in every area of over the armed services at.

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National defense is now Establishments—the War each operating virtually or setting up its own required each carrying out its own i

It is true that here and Chiefs of Staff, the Cent and Development Board, t the principal joint agency practice, however, their se results rests in some cases and willingness to coopera

I might explain, at this and Development Board. Weapons Committee, unde Vannevar Bush. He told did resign. Because, he s

He was Chairman of t Chiefs of Staff, he said th in him, when it got above l unanimity of agreement everything.

Secretary Forrestal and set it up as a joint body u the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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that are called logistics. The same reasons that necessitated unity of control in every area of operations overseas point to unity of control over the armed services at the seat of government.

The need for a unified organization, I submit, will be appreciated by considering the structure we have at present and the defects inherent in it. The field is single, but the organization is double.

National defense is now the responsibility of two separate Military Establishments—the War Department and the Navy Department—each operating virtually on its own; each making its own plans; each setting up its own requirements in manpower, money, and equipment; each carrying out its own designs in filling those needs.

It is true that here and there we have interservice ties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Research and Development Board, the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board are the principal joint agencies. These groups are doing good work. In practice, however, their scope is limited, and their power to achieve results rests in some cases on nothing more than mutual good feeling and willingness to cooperate.

I might explain, at this point, the operations of the Joint Research and Development Board. That had formerly been the Joint New Weapons Committee, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush. He told me a year ago that he was through, and he did resign. Because, he said, you could not get effective action.

He was Chairman of that Board, and, in the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said that while the responsibility was concentrated in him, when it got above him, it branched out again into a body where unanimity of agreement was necessary. And, he said, that blocks everything.

Secretary Forrestal and I discussed it, and we decided that we could set it up as a joint body under the two Secretaries, and take it out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To induce Dr. Bush to continue with the work, we each gave him our word, our personal word, that his decision would be accepted by both of us to govern the two Departments. That is not in the law, and it does not govern any subsequent Secretaries that come in.

But we both agreed that we would take his decision as binding on us, just the same as if it were our own decision. It was the only way in which we could get real coordination of research and development work to be carried on by the two Departments, together with an allocation of responsibilities between them, to try to cut out some of this infernal overlapping that was taking place; and that has worked, I think, well, but it rests upon the personal word of Secretary Forrestal and me.

We cannot get effective unity by reliance on the committee system alone. During the war we created scores of Army-Navy committees. They did not prevent competition in procurement of manpower and equipment. They did not prevent the waste that is inevitable when you have separate establishments maintaining parallel and overlapping activities. Why was that, you ask? Because the members of the committee represented frequently would not yield on a point they deemed of importance to their own service. And that goes just as much for the Army as it does for the Navy.

There was no executive, short of the President himself, with power to stop the prolonged debate and make the required decision.



The bill provides for the fullest development of our capabilities in economics and science.

This will be the responsibility of the three boards to be established by the bill: The Research and Development Board, the National Security Resources Board, and the Munitions Board.

The knowledge produced by this combined effort will be available to all services. Full freedom of inquiry and full exploitation of the results can only come by organized pooling of scientific knowledge.

During World War II our production astonished American citizens as well as our enemies. Our allies made us a gift of 2 years' time, however, in which to make this production ready for battle. In the future that productive capacity can have a greater diplomatic usefulness for the prevention of war, provided it is organized for action, instead of being a potential requiring years to develop.

The bill provides for enlargement of our capacity to know the capabilities of our possible enemies—how they can attack us, and with what. The Central Intelligence Agency will serve all branches of the Defense Establishment.

The bill enhances our capacity for military readiness, the essence of security.

One requirement for readiness is new weapons which are most likely to be decisive. Air weapons, existing and possible, are characterized by a constantly increasing power of destruction, by increasing speed, by lengthening range, and by greater facility for technical and tactical surprise than ever before.

Another requirement for readiness is control of the air wherever our national security might be exposed to attack.

The bill provides the organization for this purpose by giving the Air Force equal status with the Army and Navy under the Secretary of National Defense.

To have the confidence required by national security we must be able to control all approaches to our country.

Our capability for prompt and decisive air retaliation must be instantaneous. Such action must be closely coordinated with the Army and Navy to enable us either to capture, or to destroy by air bombardment, the launching sites on enemy territory from which might come airplanes, or guided missiles, or submarines.

In the last war, the Germans had perfected orthodox methods. They seemed impregnable on the Continent. The only way to break the will of their high command was to destroy its capacity for war. The chief flank the Germans had left exposed was the air. But to carry out the great bomber offensives necessary to destroy German's capacity in key industries, we had first to gain control of the air. That required 2 1/2 years of build-up of force after Pearl Harbor. We won this control by destroying the enemy's air power in the air, on the ground, and in the factories.

Thereafter, the destruction by bombardment of the enemy's war-making potential made possible the invasion without prohibitive losses, insured our surface advance, and gave freedom of action to all forces—land, sea, and air.

In modern warfare, there is the land battle, the sea battle, and the air battle. For victory all must be closely integrated.

Our battle experience of nearly 4 years proved that control of the air is gained most economically by the employment of air forces